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EVENT JURISDICTION AND PROTECTIVE COORDINATION:
LESSONS FROM THE SEPTEMBER 11TH LITIGATION
Robin J. Effron *

Shortly after the tragic events of September 11, 2001, Congress passed the Air
Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act (ATSSSA). The September 11th
Victim Compensation Fund (VCF) was the centerpiece of the statute and provided a
source of no-fault compensation to the tragedy’s victims and victims’ families. The
ATSSSA also allowed victims to elect to pursue traditional litigation instead.
The ATSSSA contains three jurisdictional features that have shaped the path of
the litigation. The Act created a federal cause of action “for damages arising out of” the
terrorist related aircraft crashes; it gave the Southern District of New York original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all actions “resulting from or relating to the terrorist-related
aircraft crashes.” Finally, it implemented a liability cap by limiting recovery in all
actions to the defendants’ available liability insurance. These jurisdictional aspects of
the “traditional” litigation option under the ATSSSA contain unusual and practically
unprecedented elements, yet they have received almost no scholarly attention. This
Article attempts to fill that gap by telling the story of the course of the September 11th
litigation, tracking the challenges and issues that have arisen as a result of the ATSSSA
coordination mandate, and exploring the relationship between federalization of forum
and aggregation of claims.
The jurisdictional puzzles seen in the September 11th litigation call for two new
labels. “Event jurisdiction” refers to Congress’s choice to give the federal courts subject
matter jurisdiction over an “event” of perceived national importance, rather than
locating subject matter jurisdiction over a certain class of cases or type of claim. The
second phenomenon deserves the label “protective coordination” because, like protective
jurisdiction, it evinces a congressional desire to protect certain real or perceived federal
interests by manipulating the shape and direction of certain classes of lawsuits. The
Article concludes by suggesting how Congress might better evaluate post-disaster
litigation legislation in the future.
INTRODUCTION
On September 11, 2001 terrorists hijacked four airplanes, crashing two of them
into the World Trade Center towers in New York City, and one into the Pentagon outside
of Washington, D.C. Passengers on the fourth plane managed to wrest control from the
terrorists and crash the plane into the ground in Shanksville, Pennsylvania before the
*

Bigelow Fellow and Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago. From October 3, 2004 through
September 30, 2005, the author worked for the Hon. Alvin K. Hellerstein as the law clerk assigned to the
September 11 cases consolidated before his court. All opinions expressed are solely those of the author and
do not reflect Judge Hellerstein’s position on any aspect of the litigation. Thanks to Douglas Baird, Adam
Samaha, Jamelle Sharpe, Dave Fagundes, Daniel Abebe, Jonathan Masur, Jonathan Mitchell, Shyam
Balganesh, Lee Fennell, Noah Zatz, and Mary Coombs for helpful comments.

1

Effron

Event Jurisdiction and Protective Coordination
Forthcoming, Southern Cal. L. Rev. 2008

terrorists could use it to harm another civilian target. Over 2,973 people lost their lives
on the planes and on the ground, 1 and many more were injured. Property damage was
estimated in the billions of dollars. 2 In the immediate aftermath the nation stood
transfixed at the scale of the catastrophe before them. Television channels aired news 24
hours a day for over a week after the incident, documenting the frantic rescue and
recovery missions, and straining to understand how and why this tragedy had occurred.
By September 29, 2001, the rescue missions were officially declared at an end, and the
longer term clean-up had begun. The pile of debris at the World Trade Center site in
lower Manhattan continued to smolder for over three months, and it was nearly one year
before workers had finished clearing the debris.
Shortly after the tragic events of September 11, 2001, Congress passed the Air
Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act (ATSSSA). 3 The September 11th
Victim Compensation Fund (VCF) was the centerpiece of the statute and provided a
source of no-fault compensation to the tragedy’s victims and victims’ families. The
ATSSSA also allowed victims to elect to pursue traditional litigation instead. Congress
intended for the ATSSSA to serve a dual purpose. For the victims of the attacks, the
statute would ensure an option for a speedy strict liability recovery. For the potential
defendants, particularly the airline industry, the statute would shield them from crushing
liability and possible insolvency and industry-wide collapse.
Combined with a cap on liability for the airlines (and later other industries and
government actors), the ATSSSA and its unique compensation fund were both hailed and
scorned as an unprecedented model of tort victim compensation. Over thirty scholarly
articles have been written about the VCF. The VCF, however, is only one half of the
compensation story. The jurisdictional aspects of the “traditional” litigation option under
the ATSSSA contain unusual and practically unprecedented elements, yet they have
received almost no scholarly attention. This Article attempts to fill that gap.
The ATSSSA contains three jurisdictional features that have shaped the path of
the litigation. The Act created a federal cause of action “for damages arising out of the
hijacking and subsequent crashes of American Airlines flights 11 and 77, and United
Airlines flights 93 and 175, on September 11, 2001.” 4 Section 408(b)(3) gave the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York (SDNY) “original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all actions brought for any claim (including any claim for loss
of property, personal injury, or death) resulting from or relating to the terrorist-related
aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001.” 5 Finally, it implemented a liability cap by
limiting recovery in all actions to the defendants’ available liability insurance. 6

1

THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST
ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES (2005).
2
Id.
3
ATSSSA, Pub. L. No. 107-42, 115 Stat. 230 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.S. § 40101).
4
Id, § 408(b)(1).
5
Id. at § 408(b)(3).
6
Id. at § 408(c).
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This article tells the story of the course of the September 11th litigation, and
tracks the challenges and issues that have arisen as a result of the ATSSSA coordination
mandate. The unexpected twists and turns that the litigation has taken suggests two new
labels for jurisdictional concepts, “event jurisdiction” and “protective coordination.”
Congress’s choice to vest jurisdiction in a particular federal district court is an act
of significant consequence. It manifests a desire by Congress to control the scope,
organization, and direction of complex litigation, decisions normally reserved for other
judicial actors such as the parties, the trial judge, state court actors, the Judicial
Conference of the United States, and the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation
(JPML).
The jurisdictional puzzles seen in the September 11th litigation call for two new
labels. “Event jurisdiction” refers to Congress’s choice to give the federal courts subject
matter jurisdiction over an “event” of perceived national importance, rather than locating
subject matter jurisdiction over a certain class of cases or type of claim. The second
phenomenon deserves the label “protective coordination” because, like protective
jurisdiction, it evinces a congressional wish to protect certain real or perceived federal
interests by manipulating the shape and direction of certain classes of lawsuits. These
venue and federalization provisions of the ATSSSA are not accidental aspects of the
statutory scheme, are phenomena deserving of analysis and criticism.
Part I tells the story of the complex and often unexpected dimensions of the
September 11th litigation. It shows that aside from doctrinal problems, federalization of
claims arising out of an event and congressional specifications of venue present serious
pragmatic concerns. Part II of this Article discusses the basis for federal jurisdiction in
these cases, and identifies Congress’s grant of jurisdiction in the ATSSSA as a form of
“event jurisdiction.” It then questions whether such event jurisdiction is a valid basis for
federal jurisdiction over state law claims, and concludes that most of the serious concerns
arise as a result of protective coordination. Part III provides a brief overview of the legal
doctrines of venue, consolidation and coordination, and introduces the concept of
protective coordination. This Part observes that protective coordination may insert an
additional layer of complexity into the already troubling constitutional problems of
protective jurisdiction. Part IV suggests for how Congress might better draft legislation
such as the ATSSSA in the future by offering a brief case study comparing the September
11th litigation with the post-Hurricane Katrina litigation.
This inquiry thus has a broad and narrow aim. The broad goal is to use the
September 11th litigation as a case study for examining some under-theorized aspects of
the role of federalism in jurisdiction and venue. The more specific goal is to provide a
comprehensive picture of the September 11th litigation that has been proceeding outside
of the VCF and to answer the question: just how successful has the ATSSSA been at
creating a centralized and streamlined litigation process for these claims? If, as I argue,
the enterprise has not been entirely successful, then where did Congress go wrong?
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I.
THE SEPTEMBER 11 LITIGATION EXPERIENCE
A careful examination of the progress of the September 11 litigation contributes
to an understanding of the utility and advisability of coordination of cases by federal
statute. Over the past six years, scholars and practitioners have debated the effectiveness
and prudence of the Victim’s Compensation Fund, the statute’s central liability
innovation. 7 Some commentators also opined that the ATSSSA’s jurisdictional
mandate—that all cases arising out of the September 11th terrorist attacks would be
brought in federal court—combined with the statute’s directive that underlying state tort
law would provide the rules of decision, creates the problem of so-called “protective
jurisdiction.” 8 This jurisdictional aspect of the ATSSSA vests jurisdiction not simply in
the federal courts, but in the SDNY. Scholars and practitioners alike have ignored this
aspect of the statute, perhaps because it appears so ordinary. In fact, this sort of provision
is nearly unprecedented in statutory drafting.
What follows is an account of the progress of the September 11th claims litigated
under the ATSSSA. 9 The September 11th litigation is a lesson in the unexpected. It is
the story of how a group of cases that began as one relatively coherent group of claims, In
re September 11 Litigation in fact became five fairly distinct groups of cases designated
by three different master calendar numbers. September 11th Litigation quickly became
the umbrella term for a two-part disaster litigation, a two-part mass tort litigation, and an
insurance battle. It is a narrative that is used in Part 0 to demonstrate the incoherence of
“event jurisdiction,” and in Part III to caution against future use of “protective
coordination.”
A. The Initial Assignment to Judge Hellerstein and the First Motion to
Consolidate Separate cases
By the middle of 2002, Judge Hellerstein had accepted twelve cases filed pursuant
to the ATSSSA. The defendants to date included the airlines, airport security companies,
and other aviation related entities, World Trade Center Properties and its various
subsidiaries, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, and other property owners
and operators on the WTC site. Shortly thereafter, the Court granted a motion by the

7

For evaluation, praise, and criticism of the VCF, see, e.g., James C. Harris, Comment, Why the
September 11th Victim Compensation Fund Proves the Case for a New Zealand-Style Comprehensive Social
Insurance Plan in the United States, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1367 (2006); Elizabeth Berkowitz, The
Problematic Role of the Special Master: Undermining the Legitimacy of the September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund, 24 YALE L & POL’Y REV. 1 (2006); Robert M. Ackerman, The September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund: An Effective Administrative Response to a National Tragedy, 10 HARV. NEGOT. L.
REV. 135 (2005); Linda S. Mullenix, The Future of Tort Reform: Possible Lessons from the World Trade
Center Victim Compensation Fund, 53 EMORY L.J. 1315 (2004); Erin G. Holt, Note, The September 11th
Victim Compensation Fund: Legislative Justice Sui Generis, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 513 (2004).
8
Eric J. Segall, Article III As a Grant of Power: Protective Jurisdiction, Federalism and the Federal
Courts, 54 FLA. L. REV. 361 (2002)
9
A chart summarizing the field of the September 11th Litigation appears on page18.
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Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to intervene in the cases, 10 as well as to
consolidate the cases pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a). 11 On November 1, 2002 Judge
Hellerstein formalized this consolidation by assigning a master docket number and a
caption to the pending actions. 12 The assigned caption, “In re September 11 Litigation”,
suggests what the parties and the judge believed at that time: that the litigation would be
described and handled as one large group before a single judge, with only a few
exceptions. 13
The cases filed within the first months after September 11 matched these
expectations. Most claims involved allegations of personal injury, wrongful death, or
property damage suffered on September 11th itself. The judge worked with the litigants
during these initial months to coordinate the proceedings pending before SDNY with the
proceedings of the Victim Compensation Fund (VCF), and to organize how any
remaining litigation would proceed.

i. The Victim Compensation Fund
Congress created the VCF under the ATSSSA as an alternative to litigation,
intending for it to provide a swift and reliable source of compensation for victims while
simultaneously shielding the airline industry from potentially crippling lawsuits. 14 The
Fund only covered personal injury and wrongful death cases, it did not apply to instances
of property damage or business loss. Ultimately, the VCF processed over 7,300 cases
and awarded a median of $1.6 million per victim in compensation. 15
10

The TSA moved to intervene in the cases because of discovery issues involving Sensitive Security
Information (SSI). See, infra, notes 90 and accompanying text.
11
Mariani v. United Airlines, 2002 WL 1685382 (S.D.N.Y.) (ordering that “all actions for wrongful
death, personal injury, and property damage or business loss currently pending or hereinafter filed pursuant
to the Act against any airline and/or airline security company . . . are hereby consolidated for purposes of
pretrial proceedings.”).
12
In re September 11 Litigation, No. 21 MC 97, order at 1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2002).
13
Two groups of cases were excluded from Judge Hellerstein’s docket from the outset of the
litigation. The first were the cases against alleged promoters, financers, sponsors and supporters of the
September 11th terrorist attacks, excluded because they were explicitly excluded from claims under the
ATSSSA. ATSSSA § 408(c). These cases were originally filed in a few different districts, and themselves
became an MDL in the SDNY, consolidated before Judge Casey. See In re Terrorist Attacks on September
11, 2001, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1377 (J.P.M.L. 2003). The second were cases against and among the insurers of
property damaged at ground zero. See, e.g., Canada Life Assurance Co. v. Converium Rückversicherung
(Deutschland) AG, 210 F.Supp.2d 322, 329-30 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (no federal jurisdiction under the ATSSSA
for a dispute between a reinsurer and retrocessionaire concerning losses arising out of terrorist-related
crashes of September 11). The one exception to this rule were the liability insurance provider cases, which
remained before Judge Hellerstein. ATSSSA § 405(c)(3)(B)(i) (suits to recover “collateral source
obligations” excluded from ATSSSA jurisdiction). See, infra, notes 77-80 and accompanying text for
discussion of these cases.
14
The creation and administration of the VCF was a unique and controversial remedy by Congress,
and has received extensive scholarly commentary. See, supra note 7.
15
FINAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER, SEPTEMBER 11TH VICTIM COMPENSATION FUND OF 2001.
Around $7 billion dollars was paid. 2,880 claimants whose family members died in the crashes or building
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Although the Special Master’s compensation determinations were “final and not
subject to judicial review,” 16 Judge Hellerstein adjudicated disputes related to the
administration of the VCF. In a series of rulings, he sustained the regulations for the
VCF promulgated by the Department of Justice and the compensation formula devised by
Special Master Feinberg against a number of challenges on administrative law grounds, 17
interpreted the meaning of a waiver of a right to sue under the ATSSSA, 18 and
determined when a claim was deemed “filed” with the Special Master. 19 These holdings
reflected September 11th litigation as Congress probably had imagined it: the district
court was spared the task of adjudging or reviewing awards to individual plaintiffs, but
played an important background role in settling disputes over the interpretation of the
statute and structure of the Fund’s administration.
ii. Organizing the Remaining Litigation
As the deadline for victims to apply to the VCF came to a close, Judge Hellerstein
and the litigants intensified the focus on organizing the remaining litigation. The litigants
appeared to fall into three broad categories. (1) Insurance companies that provided
liability insurance for Silverstein Properties and PANYNJ; 20 (2) litigants with claims of
wrongful death and personal injury who had elected not to enter the VCF, including a
number of personnel involved in the rescue and clean-up effort who had begun to file
claims alleging respiratory injury; and (3) property damage plaintiffs. A few
miscellaneous cases also remained. 21
The remaining litigants scored their first major victory on the path to trial in 2003
while the VCF was still open. 22 Judge Hellerstein ruled that the aviation defendants
owed a duty of care to the ground victims because the events were within the scope of
foreseeable duty. 23
collapses and 2,680 persons who suffered physical injury at the Pentagon and WTC site received awards.
Id.
16
ATSSSA, at § 405(b)(3).
17
Colaio v. Feinberg, 262 F.Supp.2d 273 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), aff’d in part, appeal dismissed in part by,
Schneider v. Feinberg, 345 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2003).
18
In re September 11th Litigation, No. 21 MC 97, 2004 WL 1320897 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2004).
19
In re September 11th Litigation, No. 21 MC 97, 2003 WL 23145579 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2003).
20
See infra, note 77 and accompanying text.
21
See, e.g., Grosshandels-und Lagerei-Berufsgenossenschaft v. World Trade Center Properties, LLC,
435 F.3d 136, 139 (2d Cir.2006) (affirming district court decision that German insurers cannot pursue state
law tort claims on behalf of victims who have received VCF benefits).
22
Since participation in the VCF precluded a plaintiff from proceeding with any civil litigation, see
ATSSSA at § 405(c)(3)(B)(i), the court created a Suspense Docket to allow plaintiffs to preserve their right
to file a civil action while deciding whether to pursue a claim before the VCF. In re September 11
Litigation, No. 21 MC 97, order (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2003). The VCF administrators created a similar
procedure by which families could submit a preliminary application, without waiving the right to sue. 28
C.F.R. § 104.21(b).
23
In re September 11 Litigation, 280 F. Supp.2d 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that “plaintiffs and
society generally could have reasonably expected that the screening performed at airports by the Aviation
Defendants would be for the protection of people on the ground as well as for those in airplanes.” and that
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The court denied motions to dismiss ground victims’ complaints brought by the
PANYNJ and WTC Entities defendants as well, holding that under New York law, they
owed a duty of care to the lessees, occupants, and others on the premises. 24
Judge Hellerstein rejected the argument that the criminal acts of the terrorists
were intervening acts that broke the chain of causation, holding that it was too early to
rule that proximate cause could not be found. Citing the absence of a well-developed
factual record, the court put this argument on hold, finding proximate cause at least at the
level of the plaintiffs’ allegations. 25
With the denial of the motions to dismiss against the aviation defendants, the
PANYNJ and the WTC entities, the litigation against a multitude of defendants was set to
continue to discovery and, possibly, a trial. 26 The decision also highlighted the ways in
which the litigation ahead would be complex. Had legal remedies been limited by a
small class of victims on the planes against a small group of defendants, the cases would
have resembled an air and common disaster litigation. 27 The district court’s decision,
however, recognized that September 11th involved multiple classes on victims that were
owed varying duties by different types of defendants. At this stage in the litigation, it
was enough for Judge Hellerstein to conclude that cases could proceed beyond the Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, and that development of a factual record was required for any
further determinations. The complexity of the duty question foreshadowed the ways in
which different classes of plaintiffs would pull the once unitary litigation in different
directions.
B. Respiratory Distress Cases – 21 MC 100 and 21 MC 102
The collapse of the towers at Ground Zero led to a major rescue, recovery and
clean-up effort. The City of New York took control of the WTC site immediately after
the collapse of the buildings and did not return control of the site to the PANYNJ until
July, 2002. 28 These post-collapse efforts involved thousands of fire fighters and other
rescue personnel coordinated by a number of public and private parties. The acts of
heroic rescue workers and selfless volunteers are an enduring memory of the days and
months after September 11th. 29 The reality is, however, that the vast majority of those
“the crash of the airplanes was within the class of foreseeable hazards resulting from negligently performed
security screening.”).
24
280 F. Supp.2d at 299-301. (“the parties and society would reasonably expect that the WTC
Defendants would have a duty to the occupants of the Twin Towers in designing, constructing, repairing
and maintaining the structures, in conforming to appropriate building and fire safety codes, and in creating
appropriate evacuation routes and procedures should an emergency occur.”).
25
280 F. Supp.2d at 293 (aviation defendants) and 302 (WTC entities).
26
In July 2, 2007 Judge Hellerstein ordered, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b) that some of the 21 MC
97 cases would be bifurcated and proceed to trial on the issue of damages only. Order of July 2, 2007, 21
MC 97.
27
A designation used for administrative purposes by the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation.
28
In re World Trade Center Disaster Site Litigation, 414 F.3d 352, 358 (2d Cir. 2005).
29
For more comprehensive narrative accounts of the rescue, recovery, and clean-up effort see 9-11
COMMISSION, THE 9-11 COMMISSION REPORT 278-323 (2004); Jean Eggen, Toxic Torts at Ground Zero, 39
Arizona L. Rev. 383 (2007).
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involved in the cleanup effort were employees of government agencies or government
contractors and Ground Zero was transformed into a giant workplace. And with a
workplace came accidents. As of early 2002, the extent of workplace injury at the WTC
site was underappreciated. According to one report, only “35 of the more than 1,500
workers assigned to help clear debris from the World Trade Center site were seriously
injured in more than six months of work there,” and a federal report proclaimed that the
job has turned out to be far less dangerous than an average demolition job in the United
States.” This was a premature prediction. 30
Workers injured at the site began to file complaints for violations under New
York State Labor Laws in state court. 31 The defendants removed these cases to federal
court and the plaintiffs moved for remand. Judge Hellerstein granted the motion to
remand in two of these early cases in which plaintiffs alleged injury from falling debris at
the WTC site.
The opinions in Graybill v. City of New York 32 and Spagnuolo v. City of New
York 33 set the outer boundaries for the subject matter jurisdiction of cases brought under
or removed pursuant to the ATSSSA. 34 He found that the tort concept of “proximate
causation provides a useful framework for limiting the scope” 35 of jurisdiction and that it
was insufficient merely to allege that “the accident took place on the WTC site.” 36 This
was the first instance in which the substantive tort principle of proximate cause was used
(if only by analogy) to make a jurisdictional determination. As will be seen later, when
event jurisdiction is an organizing principle of federalizing claims, the district judge will
need to “front-end” proximate cause analysis or make proximate cause-like
determinations in order to rule on jurisdiction.
i. The First Grouping – Claims of Respiratory Injury by On-Site
Workers (21 MC 100)
Allegations of respiratory injury presented a more complicated jurisdictional
challenge than Graybill and Spagnuolo. The first workers to allege respiratory injuries
from the WTC site filed lawsuits in New York state court in early 2002. 37

30

Eric Lipton, Injuries Few Among Crews at Tower Site, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2002, at B1.
NY CLS Labor § 241. New York Labor law provides a cause of action for construction, repair and
demolition work and has been said to establish strict liability. See George W. Conk, Will the Post
September 11th World be a Post-Tort World?, (manuscript) at 25-27 (2006) for a description of the relevant
New York labor law and how it might apply to WTC site workers’ claims.
32
Graybill v. City of New York, 247 F. Supp.2d 345, 346 (2002).
33
Spagnuolo v. City of New York, 246 F.Supp.2d 872 (2002).
34
Graybill v. City of New York, 247 F. Supp.2d 345, 346 (2002)(“Congress did not intend to oust
state court jurisdiction in cases such as this involving injuries common to construction and demolition sites
generally, and risks and duties not alleged to be particular to the special conditions caused by the terroristrelated aircraft crashes of September 11.”) (emphasis added).
35
Id., at 352.
36
Id.
37
Hickey v. NYC, 02 Civ. 8434 (2002).
31
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The workers claimed that they suffered the injuries as a result of breathing air at
the WTC site that was polluted by a multitude of toxins released as collapse of the towers
and the fires that burned there for months afterwards. They alleged that the City, the
PANYNJ, and private entities 38 were negligent because they failed to provide the
workers with appropriate respiratory masks and safety gear. 39
Eager to be included in the statutory liability cap, the defendants removed the
cases to federal court in the S.D.N.Y. under the ATSSSA. Over the next several months
Judge Hellerstein received about 1200 40 such respiratory injury claims and grouped them
alongside other personal injury claims. 41 The number of plaintiffs alleging respiratory
injury had, however, grown significantly so that the judge and the parties agreed that they
warranted the creation of a separate master calendar designation. 42
It was during this time that Judge Hellerstein first ruled on the motions to remand
the cases to state court. The majority of plaintiffs were anxious to see the cases back in
New York state court, a forum in which they believed would be familiar with processing
workers’ compensation claims, 43 and, more important, a forum which was almost
certainly free from the liability cap of the ATSSSA.
The district court ruling on subject matter jurisdiction attempted to split the
difference. Judge Hellerstein accepted that the ATSSSA provided an adequate basis for
federal question jurisdiction. The court’s task, then, was to interpret the meaning of
“arose out of, resulted from, and were related to” of the ATSSSA. 44 Having already
ruled that ordinary workplace accidents that occurred after September 11, 2001 itself
were not a sufficient basis of federal jurisdiction, 45 the court was left with the task of
sorting out exactly how unique respiratory injuries were to “the events of September 11”
38

These defendants included Silverstein Properties and the multitude of contractors and construction
companies involved in the clean-up operation.
39
In re World Trade Center Disaster Site Litigation, 270 F.Supp.2d 357, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). See
also Eggen, supra note 29 To the extent that “the equipment was available, there was little effort to
properly fit the masks, to educate workers regarding the risks, to overcome to considerable misinformation
that had been put forth, or to enforce the equipment’s use by the workers.”); Conk, supra note 31 at 21
(citing plaintiffs’ statement of undisputed facts).
40
In re World Trade Center Disaster Site Litigation, 270 F.Supp.2d 357, 360 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). These
cases include plaintiffs who attempted to file as a class action. Judge Hellerstein refused to certify the class
on the grounds that the task of proving individual causation of each injury failed the commonality
requirement of Rule 23. The plaintiffs were required to refile individually and only spouses could share a
docket number.
41
These cases were placed on the Suspense Docket along with all other September 11th related cases.
A few of the respiratory injury plaintiffs who filed claims during this period also filed claims with the VCF,
and their claims were dismissed in April of 2004 along with the other plaintiffs who had opted to avail
themselves of the VCF procedure as an alternative to litigation. 21 MC 100, Order of April 21, 2004.
42
Order of February 11, 2003.
43
A few plaintiffs, however, did not move for remand and agreed with defendants that federal law
governed the case. In re World Trade Center Disaster Site Litigation, 270 F.Supp.2d 357, 363 n.4
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
44
ATSSSA, § 408(b)(3).
45
See, supra, notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
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and how far removed in time the injuries could be from September 11 and still “arise
from” events of that day.
The court held that “claims for respiratory injury based on exposures suffered at
the World Trade Center site between September 11, 2001 and September 29, 2001 ‘arise
out of,’ ‘result from,’ and are ‘related to’ the attacks of September 11, 2001” because
they involved the official search and rescue effort. 46 All other claims alleging injuries
that occurred after this period were remanded to state court because “by September 29,
2001, that predominant task officially ended and workers’ efforts were focused on . . .
clean-up of the World Trade Center site.” 47
Recognizing that the plain language of the statute contains language of complete
preemption, 48 the court identified its primary interpretive task as defining the scope of
state law claims that are pre-empted by the federal cause of action established in the
ATSSSA. Judge Hellerstein was particularly sensitive to the fact that a finding of
preemption in these cases would displace not only ordinary state law tort claims, but state
labor law claims. He found that the ATSSSA lacked the clear congressional intent to preempt “such a strong and long-standing state policy” and “oust the court having expertise
interpreting [New York Labor Law].” 49
Relying on the outer jurisdictional boundaries set by Graybill and Spagnuolo,
Judge Hellerstein concluded that the jurisdiction over the workers’ claims needed to be
limited to avoid a seemingly unlimited field of jurisdiction. At the same time, he
acknowledged the legislative history that underscored the congressional intent to
“promote efficiency” in the September 11th litigation and Congress’s intent to provide
defendants including New York City with “’much needed relief from potential liability
arising out of the attacks on the World Trade Center.’” 50 He thus sought a point in time
that demarcated a shift from September 11 events to ordinary workplace events and held
that “September 29, 2001 is a proper demarcation point and the World Trade Center site
is a proper geographical limitation” because “[a]fter that point, or outside the World
Trade Center site, the goals of demolition, clean-up and removal of debris were
dominant, the traditional state interest in regulating the health and safety of employees in
the work place re-emerged, and any federal interest in displacing traditional state police
powers waned.” 51
The court then employed the tort doctrine of proximate cause to reinforce the
holding that “the causal relationship with the terrorist related aircraft crashes becomes
attenuated, and duties and responsibilities associated with the workplace become
46

In re World Trade Center Disaster Site Litigation, 270 F.Supp.2d 357, 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
270 F.Supp.2d at 372.
48
270 F.Supp.2d at 368. The doctrine states that “‘if a federal cause of action completely pre-empts a
state cause of action any complaint that comes within the scope of the federal cause of action necessarily
‘arises under’ federal law.’” 270 F.Supp.2d at 366 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation
Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 22 1983)).
49
270 F.Supp.2d at 374.
50
270 F.Supp.2d at 371 (quoting letter submitted by Mayor Rudolph Giuliani in support of the
amendment.).
51
270 F.Supp. at 374.
47
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dominant.” 52 Proximate cause thus returned to the court’s jurisdictional analysis as a
way of linking the task of statutory interpretation with the more functional task of
attempting to group cases sensibly for litigation purposes.
Some of the parties agreed with the court that, like the duty of care question
generally, the question of subject matter jurisdiction was so important to how the
litigation would proceed that it required early resolution. Finding that “the scope of
federal jurisdiction in these cases involves a controlling question of law as to which there
is a substantial ground for difference of opinion” and that an “immediate appeal also may
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation,” Judge Hellerstein certified
the issue for interlocutory appeal.53
The number of respiratory injury cases filed ballooned while the court waited for
a definitive statement on jurisdiction from the Second Circuit. Judge Hellerstein denied
certification of any class actions and required that each plaintiff file under a separate
docket number in order to best organize pleadings and potential causation questions. The
individual complaints had begun to present extraordinary organizational challenges for
Judge Hellerstein’s chambers, and he sought a way to engage the parties’ help in
organizing the information about each litigant so that the information would be accessible
to the court, the parties, and the public. 54 Charged with this task plaintiffs’ and
defendants’ committees negotiated a new set of Master Complaints that included a
“check box” section. 55 The court hoped to collect data on, among other things, the nature
of injuries alleged, the type of worker involved, where on the WTC site the worker was
assigned, and the time period that he or she worked. Although the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure do not require this sort of detailed pleading, Judge Hellerstein urged the parties
to consider the advantages to defining the contours of each case and of the litigation as a
whole as early as possible. 56
In July of 2005, the Second Circuit delivered an opinion interpreting the
jurisdictional and pre-emptive scope of the ATSSSA in quite general terms, 57 holding
that “Congress intended ATSSSA to pre-empt at least the claims brought by the plaintiffs
in the 35 cases dealt with in the district court’s opinion.” 58 The court emphasized the
forceful language of the statute in displacing state law remedies but also recognized the
boundary issue because “the respective reaches of terms such as ‘arising out of,’

52

270 F.Supp. at 377.
270 F.Supp.2d at 381. As a technical matter, Judge Hellerstein could only certify those cases for
appeal in which he had denied the motions to remand because a district court grant of remand for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction is not appealable. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).
54
Transcript of Status Conference.
55
See Order of August 8, 2005, 21 MC 100.
56
Hearing Transcripts, passim.
57
As a technical matter, the court of appeals only had jurisdiction over the appeals of the plaintiffs
challenging the denial of their request to remand the cases to state court. 414 F.3d at 371. The Second
Circuit held that the orders of remand issued by the district court were unreviewable under 28 U.S.C. §
1447(d). Id. at 363-71.
58
414 F.3d at 375.
53
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‘resulting from,’ and ‘relating to’ are not self-evident.” 59 Comparing Section 405 of the
statute (VCF eligibility) with Section 408 (creating the cause of action), the court
concluded that the “resulting from or relating to” language in Section 408 was clearly
broader than “arising out of.” 60 Because the terms “resulting from” and “relating to” are
ambiguous, the court turned to legislative history for support, and was persuaded of the
statute’s expansive scope by statements from legislators who referred to “all lawsuits,”
“all civil litigation,” and “all civil suits.”61 The court then held that “Congress intended
pre-emption to be limited to claims with respect to persons who were on the hijacked
airplanes or who were present at one of the crash sites at the time of the crashes or
immediately thereafter.” 62 The Second Circuit believed the causal connection between
the events of September 11 and the respiratory injuries were “considerably more
extensive than simple ‘but for’ causation.” 63 The court wrote:
As it requires no great stretch to view claims of injuries from inhalation of
air rendered toxic by the fires, smoke, and pulverized debris cause by the terroristrelated aircraft crashes of September 11 as claims ‘relating to’ and ‘arising out of’
those crashes, we conclude that Congress intended ATSSSA’s cause of action to
be sufficiently expansive to cover claims of respiratory injuries by workers in
sifting, removing, transporting, or disposing of that debris. 64
Convinced that the respiratory injury plaintiffs shared questions of fact and law
with other claimants under the ATSSSA, the Second Circuit rehearsed the usual litany of
reasons to consolidate cases, namely, the “undesirable effects that litigation of September
11 claims in the various state and federal courts would inevitably produce.” 65 The circuit
court did not address Judge Hellerstein’s observation that accepting jurisdiction over a
large open-ended class of litigants might have efficiency problems of its own. 66
After this lengthy discussion of the statute’s apparently clear pre-emptive force,
the court acknowledged the prominent role that state law would continue to play in
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414 F.3d at 375.
414 F.3d at 376 (“a phrase such as ‘relat[ing] to’ is ‘clearly expansive.’”)(citing New York State
Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co., 514 U.S. 645, 655 (1995).
61
414 F.3d at 377.
62
414 F.3d at 376.
63
414 F.3d at 378
64
414 F.3d at 377.
65
414 F.3d at 378 (
“These effects might include: inconsistent or varying adjudications of actions based on the
same sets of facts; adjudications having a preclusive effect on non-parties or substantially impairing
or impeding non-parties’ abilities to protect their rights; victims or their survivors without any
possibility of recovery when the limits of liability have been exhausted in other lawsuits; the
difficulties in mediation when defendants are sued in multiple state and federal courts, and the waste
of private and judicial resources in multiple state and federal courts hearing cases involving the same
factual and legal issues.”)
66
See 270 F.Supp.2d at 378-79.
60
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adjudication of the claims. “What ATSSSA itself displaces is not the substantive
standards governing liability, but only the state-law damage remedies.” 67
Despite its confidence in interpreting the ATSSSA, the court declined to delineate
the exact boundaries of the statute. “No doubt there will be some claims whose
relationship to the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001 is ‘too tenuous,
remote, or peripheral’ to warrant a finding that those claims ‘relat[e] to’ those crashes;
but we make no attempt to draw a definitive line here.” 68
The district court responded by extending jurisdiction to all cases covered by the
reasoning of the Second Circuit, 69 and has since ruled on motions by some of the
defendants concerning sovereign immunity defenses.
ii. Off-Site Workers – 21 MC 102 and “Straddler” Plaintiffs – 21 MC
103
Following the Second Circuit decision, the jurisdictional problems had not been
completely solved. 70 The district court had begun to receive a new variety of respiratory
distress claims from workers who were employed in construction or clean-up efforts in
the buildings and areas surrounding Ground Zero and scattered throughout lower
Manhattan.
Like their earlier “on-site” counterparts,71 the off-site claimants filed in state court
and the defendants removed the cases to federal district court pursuant to the ATSSSA.
190 of these plaintiffs allege to have worked both on and off the WTC Site, and the
district court created a further Master Calendar docket number to accommodate their
status. 72 The district court has not yet ruled on the jurisdictional issues. At present, the
parties are proceeding as if subject matter jurisdiction exists and have drafted master
complaints and case management orders to mirror those employed in the 21 MC 100
litigation. 73 One key difference between the two dockets is that the off-site litigants will
not have access to the Captive Insurer that will fund the awards or settlements of
plaintiffs suing the City and its contractors.
iii. Appointment of Special Masters
By the autumn of 2005 Judge Hellerstein’s concern for the enormity and
complexity of full scope of September 11th litigation before him increased. He expressed
concern to the parties that the litigation would continue for a very long period of time and
67

414 F.3d at 380.
414 F.3d at 381 (quoting Travelers, 514 U.S. at 661.) (emphasis added).
69
See Order Following Appellate Remand Extending Jurisdiction, 21 MC 100, dated July 22, 2005.
70
See Amended Order Following Appellate Remand, Extending Jurisdiction, dated July 22, 2005.
71
The parties and district court agreed to a formal definition of the World Trade Center site. It is
defined as “the 16-acre site including the sites of the buildings known as 1 World Trade Center, 2 World
Trade Center, 3 World Trade Center (a/k/a the Marriott World Trade Center Hotel), 4 World Trade Center,
5 World Trade Center and 7 World Trade Center, as well as the surrounding plaza and underground
shopping, parking, and public transit facilities.” 21 MC 100, Case Management Order 3, dated.
72
See Case Management Order No. 1, 21 MC 103, (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28 2007)
73
See Order of May, 2005.
68
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this was contrary to the congressional desire for a speedy and efficient resolution of the
lawsuits. At this time, he contemplated appointing Special Masters to oversee one or
more aspects of the litigation, especially with an eye toward some sort of a global
settlement. 74
Several attempts to mobilize this plan did not result in any appointments for the
litigation as a whole. Judge Hellerstein was able, however, to appoint Special Masters
for the respiratory distress cases. 75
C. The Liability Insurance Entanglement – 03 Civ. 0332
The events of September 11th gave rise to numerous disputes between insureds
and insurers and amongst the insurers themselves, and Judge Hellerstein accepted
jurisdiction over the liability insurance litigation pursuant to the ATSSSA. 76
As a preliminary matter, adjudicating the rights of the insureds and the
responsibilities of the insurers was complicated by the change in ownership of the World
Trade Center preceding the collapse of the towers. 77
This left the court with a
combination of “binders” and completed insurance contracts. 78 As of September 11,
2001 the insurance coverage was still in various states of completion. Only a few of the
insurers had issued final policies. The rest, including the primary policy had only issued
binders, followed by scattered negotiation communications. 79 The situation was further
complicated by the existence of two other towers of liability insurance, the insurers for
PANYNJ (who still owned and operated aspects of the WTC site such as the PATH
74

Transcript of Status Conference, 21 MC 100.
Order of October, 2006.
76
Most of these cases did not come to Judge Hellerstein because they were not brought pursuant to
the ATSSSA. See, supra, note 13 and accompanying text. In fact, many of these cases were filed in and
remained in state court.
77
The PANYNJ sold the World Trade Center to Larry Silverstein through various entities known as
Silverstein Properties or World Trade Center Properties in early 2001 after months of intense negotiations.
The PANYNJ had wanted to divest itself of the WTC. The sale was accomplished by granting a ninetynine year lease to Silverstein Properties and associated subsidiaries (World Trade Center Properties, etc.).
78
As is typical in large real estate transactions, Silverstein sought insurance coverage for the property
that was not finalized until after the deal had closed. The process of obtaining liability insurance was
further delayed by the fact that the WTC had be owned and operated by the PANYNJ, an entity that
enjoyed sovereign immunity due to its status as an intergovernmental agency. Therefore, the premises did
not have a liability record and the insurance broker had difficulty obtaining bids from prospective insurers
without this data. In re September 11th Liability Insurance Coverage Cases, 458 F. Supp.2d 104 (S.D.N.Y.
2006). In such transactions, the insurers issue a “binder” to the insured that contains the typical and
anticipated state-specific clauses for the property and risks to be insured. The parties then continue
negotiations and the final policy is issued a few months later. Another feature of a large real estate
transaction is the insurance “tower,” that is, the entity is insured by one large primary policy, and then is
insured for additional sums by layers of excess insurers. Silverstein secured a primary and secondary
“umbrella” policy from Zurich American Group (Zurich), and 8 layers of excess insurance involving as
many as twenty insurers above that. 458 F. Supp.2d at 109. The aggregate policies totaled $1 billion in
coverage. The primary policy was a $2 million per occurrence, $4 million aggregate, and the Zurich
umbrella covered $50 million per occurrence in excess of the primary policy. Id.
79
458 F. Supp.2d at 106-07.
75
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station), and the insurers for Westfield, the holding company that leased and operated the
shopping mall space beneath the WTC site. 80
Although Judge Hellerstein hesitated to accept jurisdiction of this case as part of
the ATSSSA consolidation, the parties convinced him that resolution of the insurance
dispute was integral to administration of the underlying cases. The court then found itself
drawn into a bitter and complicated dispute beset by discovery difficulties and having
little to do with the legal and factual questions arising in the underlying lawsuits. 81 In
reaching its decisions, the court realized that it would have to make several purely
hypothetical findings about the extent of coverage in the absence of clear contours of the
underlying litigation and sought to avoid making such speculative rulings. On the other
hand, ATSSSA had linked the resolution of the underlying litigation inextricably to the
limits of the available liability insurance coverage. 82 The course of the litigation and the
possibility of reaching any sort of settlement will depend on knowledge of the available
pool of insurance. These issues remain largely unresolved.

D. The Property Damage Cases – 21 MC 101 and the Special Case of 7WTC
The ATSSSA authorized a federal cause of action for plaintiffs seeking redress
for property damage as a result of the events of September 11. 83 The plaintiffs were not,
however, eligible to file claims for property damage before the VCF. 84
The property damages claims proceeded alongside the personal injury and
wrongful death cases under the heading 21 MC 97 for the first three years of the
September 11th litigation. This was unremarkable given the common issues of causation
and duty of care along with similar discovery needs of the plaintiffs. As time passed,
however, differences between the groups of plaintiffs emerged.
As a preliminary matter, the fact that the property damage plaintiffs were attached
to the personal injury and wrongful death plaintiffs meant that they had to accept a slower
timeline for litigation. Although the court ruled on preliminary issues of duty of care and
proximate cause on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss standard, the court and the parties
understood that the “real” work of moving the litigation forward could not begin until the
VCF had closed and its attendant issues were settled. 85
The property damage plaintiffs and the personal injury and wrongful death
litigants did not always stand as one unified group. Although common issues remained,
the property damage plaintiffs had their own agenda, particularly concerning damages.
Moreover, on several occasions, the property damage plaintiffs expressed concerns that a
high-visibility trial featuring the wrongful death plaintiffs might result in extremely high
80

458 F. Supp.2d at 105.
See Opinion and Order Granting Sanctions for Pleadings and Discovery Abuses, --- F.R.D. ----,
2007 WL 1739666 (S.D.N.Y. June 18, 2007).
82
458 F. Supp.2d at pin.
83
ATSSSA § § 408(b)(3).
84
ATSSSA § § 405(c)(3)(B)(i).
85
Transcripts.
81
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jury verdicts, thus cutting deeply into the liability cap; or that some of the personal injury
and wrongful death plaintiffs would act as unreasonable “hold-outs,” thus preventing a
reasonable global settlement plan. 86 In March 2005, the court ordered the creation of yet
another Master Calendar docket, 21 MC 101, “In re September 11 Property Damage and
Business Loss Litigation” to coordinate all property damage plaintiffs.
One class of property damage lawsuits presents unique issues, the insurers who
were subrogees of the owners and occupants of the building 7 World Trade Center
(7WTC). 87 Among the neighboring buildings to sustain structural damage on September
11th, 7WTC was the only building that was not directly hit but nonetheless collapsed
completely. 7WTC housed a large trading floor for Citigroup as well as New York City’s
Office of Emergency Management. Both entities relied upon massive oil tanks stored in
the building’s basement to serve as emergency power generators. This fact opened up
new avenues of causation arguments for the defendants, and caused them to implead
other parties whom they believed shared or bore complete responsibility. 88 The
defendants made motions to dismiss based on these causation arguments, related duty of
care arguments, and sovereign immunity arguments from state law and federal law
sources. Judge Hellerstein granted some of these motions in part and dismissed a number
of defendants, but the core cases remain and the causation questions remain open. The
7WTC cases have developed a sufficiently unique path such that they often meet apart
from the other litigants for status conferences and oral arguments. 89
E. Special Discovery Difficulties
The September 11th litigants have faced unusual stumbling blocks in the
discovery phase of litigation. The documents are primarily those that the plaintiffs have
sought from the aviation defendants and from the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA). The TSA classifies many documents as “Sensitive Security Information” (SSI),
and will not release these documents for discovery, or will only release redacted versions.
The decision to classify material as SSI is an administrative decision, appeal of which can
be made only to a federal circuit court. This presents a twofold problem. It denies
litigants the documents they need, and it denies the trial judge the authority to referee
discovery disputes—a classic district court function. 90
86

Transcript of Status Conference.
Luckily, 7WTC was successfully evacuated before it collapsed. Therefore, the 7WTC cases
involve only property damage plaintiffs and no personal injury or wrongful death claims.
88
See In re September 11 Property Damage and Business Loss Litigation, 2006 WL 62019 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 12, 2006); Industrial Risk Insurers v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 387 F. Supp.2d.
299 (2005). It also produced the strange situation in which the very entity for which the City claimed
sovereign immunity, OEM, was also the target of a new causation argument and the court authorized a
period of limited discovery to create a factual record pertaining to the sovereign immunity issues.
Interpreting the New York Defense Emergency Act, N.Y. Unconsol. Law § 9101, et seq., he held that the
City was entitled to immunity from suit. In re September 11 Property Damage and Business Loss
Litigation, 2006 WL 62019 at * 8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2006).
89
See, e.g., Order of January 9, 2007 regarding scheduling of 7WTC status conference.
90
See Suzanna Sherry, Logic Without Experience, The Problem of Federal Appellate Courts,
(forthcoming 2007).
87

16

Effron

Event Jurisdiction and Protective Coordination
Forthcoming, Southern Cal. L. Rev. 2008

As this Part has demonstrated, the group of lawsuits originally styled “In re
September 11th Litigation” have become five distinct tracks of cases, the personal
injury/wrongful death cases, the property damage cases, the liability insurance case, the
on-site respiratory damage cases, and the off-site respiratory cases. These cases are in
addition to the lawsuits and motions that concerned the VCF. All groups present
different legal, factual, and organization challenges for the parties and for the court. Each
case and group was brought under the ATSSSA, a statute that supposedly was passed to
bring a speedy and efficient resolution to disputes arising out of the events of September
11th. No trial on issues of liability has been set in any action, nor has any proposal for
settlement been presented to the court. The cases remain tied to each other by the
statutory jurisdictional mandate and the liability insurance cap. The following chart
summarizes the field of the September 11th Litigation:
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Survey of the 9/11 Litigation

____ = Personal injury and wrongful death claims ___ = Property damage claims
____ = Respiratory damage claims
___ = Insurance disputes
Group

ATSSSA

Defendants

Current Status

Fund administrator;
Competing claimants
to decedent funds

Closed.

Airlines; airline
security; WTC owners
and operators
(Silverstein Properties;
Westfield Properties;
PANYNJ)

Motion to dismiss denied.
Some cases to proceed to
trial on the issue of
damages only.

Personal injury/wrongful
death claimants

Terrorists and their
alleged financial
backers

21 MC 101

No.
Jurisdiction
excluded by
plain language
of ATSSSA
Yes

Property damage
claimants

21 MC 97 defendants

7WTC

Yes

Insurers of property
damaged at 7WTC
(primarily Con Edison and
PANYNJ)

21 MC 100

Yes (per 2d
Cir. Opinion)

Workers at the WTC site
in the months after 9/11
alleging respiratory
injuries

21 MC 102

Disputed

21 MC 103

Disputed

03 Civ. 332

Yes

Workers in lower
Manhattan outside of the
WTC Site alleging
respiratory injuries
Workers who worked both
on the WTC Site and
elsewhere in lower
Manhattan in the months
after 9/11 alleging
respiratory injuries
Liability insurers

21 MC 101 defendants
plus Citicorp; City of
New York; architects,
engineers and other
design professionals
City of New York,
PANYNJ; private
contractors and
construction companies
at the WTC Site.
Employers; private
contractors and
construction companies

Misc.
Insurance
disputes

No.

21 MC 97

Lawsuits
against
terrorists

Administrative
relief
authorized by
the statute.
Yes

Plaintiffs
Personal injury/ wrongful
death claimants;
Some respiratory injury
claimants
Personal injury and
wrongful death claims of
those injured on
September 11 at the WTC
Site, the Pentagon, and in
Shanksville, PA.

VCF Cases

Property damage
claimants/insurers
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Discovery difficulties as to
issues of liability.
Cases pending.

Discovery difficulties as to
issues of liability.
No trial date set.
Claims dismissed against
design professionals; some
issues of sovereign
immunity settled; no trial
date set.
Initial jurisdictional issues
litigated; some sovereign
immunity issues decided;
special masters appointed
Validity of subject matter
jurisdiction still pending.

Relevant 21 MC 100
and 21 MC 102
defendants

Validity of subject matter
jurisdiction still pending.

Primary and secondary
liability insurers (as
defendants and
counter-claimants)
Insurers

Early discovery difficulties
settled; no trial date set

Some cases closed; others
proceeding in various
federal and state courts.
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II.

EVENT JURISDICTION

Part I narrated the course that the September 11th litigation from late 2001 to
2007. This Part situates the litigation in the context of more traditional doctrines of
federal jurisdiction and federal preemption of state law causes of action. That is, it
hypothesizes how the jurisdictional questions might have played out without the
ATSSSA, and then examines exactly how the statute has shaped the contours of the
litigation. Part II.A outlines the trend of congressional and judicial expansion of federal
jurisdiction, and summarizes the possible bases for federal jurisdiction in the September
11th cases, focusing on “arising under” jurisdiction and protective jurisdiction. Part II.B
introduces the label “event jurisdiction” to describe the motivating principle behind the
federalization of claims arising from September 11th. The concept of protective
coordination introduced in Part III requires a careful evaluation of event jurisdiction,
because in order for Congress to coordinate all cases in a single forum, there must first be
federal jurisdiction over all claims so as to avoid parallel litigation in state courts.
A. The ATSSSA In Context: The Trend Towards Broader Federalization of
Forum and Substantive Law
Many commentators have noted a trend toward federalization of forum. 91 A
corollary phenomenon to the federalization of forum is the federalization of substantive
areas of law that had once been state law claims. 92 The ATSSSA is a curious example of
both of these trends. The ATSSSA specifies that the SDNY has exclusive jurisdiction
over the September 11th cases 93 but the authority for a grant of federal jurisdiction is not
obvious. While the statute mandates that state law is the applicable law of all actions
brought under it, 94 the courts have turned to the doctrine of complete preemption of state
law to uphold the statute’s jurisdictional grant. 95 This Part addresses federal question
jurisdiction from a different perspective. Instead analyzing the scope of jurisdiction
granted by the statute, this Part examines the authority for Congress to grant jurisdiction
91

See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Increasingly “Unflagging Obligation”: Federal Jurisdiction After
Saudi Basic and Anna Nicole, XX TULSA L. REV. XXX (forthcoming 2007) (“the Court has taken an
increasingly skeptical view toward doctrinal or statutory exceptions to federal jurisdiction.”); Issacharoff
and Sharkey, supra note 132 at 1414 (“the Rehnquist Court, despite its federalist billing, has largely been
an active promoter of the federalization of large bodies of substantive law and the law governing forum
selection.”); Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When it Matters: A Different Approach to
Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1314 (2004) (“Over the last several years, the Supreme Court
repeatedly has found preemption of important state laws, and done so when federal law was silent about
preemption or even when it explicitly preserved state laws.”).
92
Issacharoff and Sharkey argue, for example, that judicially created limits on punitive damages in
state law cases in state courts represents a “partial federalization” of these regulatory areas. See Issacharoff
and Sharkey, supra note 132 at 1420-22.
93
See ATSSSA § 408(b).
94
See ATSSSA § 408(b).
95
The Second Circuit held that federal jurisdiction exists to the extent that the statute completely
preempts state law. See McNally, 270 F.3d at 384; supra notes 46 - 53 and accompanying text.
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in this manner in the first place by exploring the controversial concept of “protective
jurisdiction” in which federal courts have jurisdiction over nondiverse parties and the rule
of decision is state law.
Shortly after Congress passed the ATSSSA, a few commentators began to identify
the jurisdictional provisions of the act as an instance of protective jurisdiction. 96 Despite
this academic commentary, the parties to the September 11th litigation have not argued
that the federal courts lack jurisdiction under this doctrine, nor has the district court itself
raised the argument sua sponte. 97 In fact, it is not at all clear that the ATSSSA is an
instance of protective jurisdiction. 98 The aim of this Article, however, is not simply to
present a doctrinal argument for or against the statute’s status as an instance of protective
jurisdiction. Rather, it shows how the problems that have arisen during the September
11th litigation as a result of the ATSSSA’s jurisdictional provisions are merely symptoms
of a larger, contentious issue. The inquiry may be instructive of when the use of a
protective jurisdictional statute is most effective. This in turn may illuminate some of the
current theories of protective jurisdiction.
The problem of protective jurisdiction emerges from the fact that in some
instances, Congress establishes federal jurisdiction without specifying a specific
underlying federal right or defense, 99 or establishes federal jurisdiction with a specific
mandate that state law will furnish the substantive rules of decision. 100 The Supreme
Court first approved this sort of jurisdictional grant in Osborn v. Bank of the United
States, 101 holding that Congress was authorized under Article III of the Constitution to
grant federal jurisdiction over all cases involving the Second National Bank, even if the
claim was governed by state law and the parties were not diverse. 102 Since that time,
scholars and jurists have debated the rationale and scope of Justice Marshall’s decision in
Osborn. The theory used to describe Congress’s power to grant jurisdiction over these
cases has come to be known as “protective jurisdiction,” 103 a phenomenon that “tends to
arise in situations in which Congress has authorized a federal forum, the accepted
96

See, Segall, supra note 103. See also Qian A. Gao, Note, “Salvage Operations are Usually
Preferable to the Wrecking Ball”: Barring Challenges to Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 105 COLUM. L.REV.
2369, 2400 (2005); Andrew Baak, Comment, The Illegitimacy of Protective Jurisdiction Over Foreign
Affairs, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1487, 1507 n.110 (2003); Erin Elizabeth Terrell, Note, Foreign Relations and
Federal Questions: Resolving the Judicial Split on Federal Court Jurisdiction, 35 VAND. J. TRANS. L.
1637, 1639 n.5 (2002).
97
Theoretically, any court at any time could consider the basis for federal jurisdiction and dismiss the
cases for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
98
See, infra, TAN.
99
Am. Nat’l Red Cross v. S.G. & A.E., 505 U.S. 247, 257 (1992) (upholding federal jurisdiction over
state law claims in which the Red Cross is a party because it as an organization charted by the federal
government).
100
Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2110(n)(2)(2006).
101
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 824 (1824).
102
Id.
103
See, Carole E. Goldberg-Ambrose, The Protective Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 30 UCLA L.
Rev. 542 (1983); Eric J. Segall, Article III As a Grant of Power: Protective Jurisdiction, Federalism and
the Federal Courts, 54 FLA. L. REV. 361, 364 (2002).
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minimum requirements for a case to arise under federal law are not met, and no other
basis for federal jurisdiction can be found under article III of the Constitution.” 104
Judges and commentators have defined protective jurisdiction according to a
variety of criteria. 105 Some view protective jurisdiction “as a necessary and proper
means of furthering the objects of federal legislative power identified in article I.” 106 In
other words, the boundaries of constitutional “arising under” jurisdiction are coterminous
with Congress’s legislative power. In the judiciary Justice Jackson was the main
proponent of this theory in his National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co.
plurality opinion. 107 Finding that Congress “has deliberately chosen the [federal] district
courts as the appropriate instrumentality through which to exercise part of the judicial
functions incidental to exertion of sovereignty” 108 over the District of Columbia, Justice
Jackson concluded that Congress was appropriately exercising its legislative powers. 109
The concurring and dissenting Justices argued that Justice Jackson relied on shaky
precedent, 110 and it has been noted that such use of these cases has “since been
discredited.” 111
Some proponents of this sort of theory argue that the Article I power to preempt
state law necessarily includes the “lesser” power to create federal jurisdiction. 112
104

Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 103, at 546-47.
These definitions emerge from consideration of different instances of purported protective
jurisdiction and the reasoning behind judicial approval of federal jurisdiction in each case; thus the
scholarship includes proposed definitions of protective jurisdiction as well as specific constitutional
theories to justify (or argue against) its existence. For example, in a leading article on the subject, Carole
Goldberg-Ambrose identified three major theories of protective jurisdiction. Goldberg-Ambrose, supra
note 103 at 583. .
106
See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 103 at 583 (describing what she calls the “Effectuation
Theory”).
107
337 U.S. 582 (1949). In this case, the Court considered the constitutionality of an act extending the
diversity jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, to include jurisdiction over suits “between citizens . . . of
the District of Columbia . . . and any State or Territory.” Act of April 20, 1940, ch. 117, 54 Stat. 143. Two
Justices found that the statute satisfied the constitutional diversity provision by arguing that the District was
a State. Tidewater, 337 U.S. at 617-26 (Rutledge, J., concurring). Justice Jackson wrote the other plurality
opinion deciding that protective jurisdiction existed.
108
Tidewater, 337 U.S. at 591.
109
Tidewater, 337 U.S. at 591. (
[u]nless we are to deny to Congress the same choice of means through which to govern
the District of Columbia that we have held it to have in exercising other legislative powers
enumerated in the same Article, we cannot hold that Congress lacked the power it sought to
exercise in the Act before us.”).
110
Tidewater, 337 U.S. at 610-11 (Rutledge, J. concurring).
111
See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 103 at 584.
112
See Herbert Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 216, 224-25 (1948)(“Where . . . Congress . . . can declare as federal law that contracts of
a given kind are valid and enforceable, it must be free to take the lesser step of drawing suits upon such
contracts to the district courts without displacement of the states as sources of the operative, substantive
law.”). Goldberg-Ambrose calls this variation on the Article I powers theory the “Greater Power Theory,”
On this account, cases arise under federal law “whenever Congress has the power to enact substantive rules
105
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Congress echoed these sentiments in the passage of the ATSSSA. The strongest
argument was the threat that the aviation industry would collapse under the weight of
crushing jury verdicts in thousands of lawsuits. 113 This justification arguably was
weakened when Congress amended the statute to include all defendants in the liability
cap including the City of New York and other ground defendants, entities that attracted
little or no attention as potential subjects of financial collapse. Congress also appeared
motivated to provide a federal stage for the resolution of disputes arising from such a
prominent national tragedy. It is harder, however, to conjure an Article I or Article III
area of competence merely from the fact that the September 11th attacks struck at the
emotional and political heart of Americans. One could argue instead that Congress
sometimes has an interest in ensuring that a certain group of cases are litigated together in
one forum. In order to accomplish this, it must first ensure that the federal forum has
subject matter jurisdiction over all relevant causes of action. This provides the reasoning
for allowing state claims to be litigated in federal court as a matter of supplemental
jurisdiction 114 or pursuant to bankruptcy jurisdiction. 115 This raises the question of
whether the concept that this Article labels “protective coordination” is enough of a
federal interest to justify federal subject matter jurisdiction absent any other attendant
federal claim or defense. This question probably would remain largely academic because
any coordination of cases by Congress would likely take place in the context of a statute
addressed at a specific concern, and the analysis would then return to the federal nature of
that underlying problem.
The protective jurisdiction arguments do not end with congressional intent,
however. It might be that the ATSSSA itself provides sufficient internal logic to escape
the label of protective jurisdiction. First, the creation of the VCF could qualify as
satisfying the constitutional requirements of a theory of protective jurisdiction known as
the Partial Occupation Theory 116 which would “limit protective jurisdiction to subject
areas in which Congress has already undertaken some degree of substantive
regulation.” 117 Locating the source of authority for protective jurisdiction in Article III,
to govern them, but chooses instead to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts and rely on state-made
rules.” Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 103 at 589.
113
See Cong. Report (fill in cite); perhaps add news reports.
114
28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2007).
115
See 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), which provides in full:
Notwithstanding any Act of Congress that confers exclusive jurisdiction on a court or courts other
than the district courts, the district courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all
civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11.
116
See Goldberg-Ambrose, supra note 103 at 592.
117
Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal “Question” in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 184
(1953)(defining protective jurisdiction as including cases brought in federal court “where no construction
or enforcement of federal law is required—that is, where the substantive law is not national, but state.”).
Mishkin thought that Osborn represented an instance of protective jurisdiction because Congress was
justified under the “arising under” clause of Article III to “use the ‘inferior’ federal courts as a means of
protecting interests around which it proposes to throw its cloak.” Id. at 188. He suggested that the purpose
of protective jurisdiction “would be the protection of some congressionally favored interest by exploiting
the institutional differences between the federal and state courts.” Id.
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proponents of this theory argue that this power was justified when “there is an articulated
and active federal policy regulating a field.” 118 Here protective jurisdiction gives
Congress the opportunity to achieve some degree of uniformity without imposing its own
specific rules of decision. 119
By establishing the VCF as remedy with federally created rules of decision and
administration by a federally authorized Special Master, the ATSSSA jurisdictional grant
is simply a complement to an area in which Congress has already regulated at the
substantive law level. The problem with this argument is that the ATSSSA jurisdictional
grant for lawsuits is broader than the claims eligible for the VCF. Suits for property
damage, for instance, are explicitly excluded from the VCF. Moreover, the Second
Circuit explicitly held that the personal injury and wrongful death lawsuits eligible for
federal jurisdiction occupied a broader field than those eligible for VCF claims. 120 It is
unclear, then that Congress actually has engaged in substantive regulation of the “field”
of lawsuits outside those eligible for VCF. 121
The second argument for jurisdiction internal to the ATSSSA is that the liability
cap adds an element of substantive regulation to the law, thus removing it from the realm
of “pure jurisdictional statutes.” In Mesa v. California 122 the Supreme Court stated that a
“pure jurisdictional statute” cannot by itself support federal jurisdiction. The statute in
question, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a), allows federal employees to remove state court traffic
prosecutions from state to federal court. 123 The Court held that removal was improper
unless the defendants asserted a federal defense. The federal element could not come
from Section 1442(a) alone because it “is a pure jurisdictional statute, seeking to do
nothing more than grant district court jurisdiction over cases in which a federal officer is
a defendant. Section 1442(a), therefore, cannot independently support Art. III ‘arising
under’ jurisdiction.” 124 The ATSSSA furthers several substantive goals, most notably,
the limitation of liability of the airlines and other defendants. Thus it is unlikely that the
term “pure jurisdictional statute” would apply.
In light of these justifications, it is possible that the statute occupies the murky
category of constitutionally permissible protective jurisdiction. The real question is,
however, does the existence of the liability cap change the remedy in such a significant
118

Id. at 192; Segall, supra note 8 at 383 (offering a stronger version of this theory, suggesting that
“[a]rticle III authorizes Congress to enact pure jurisdictional statutes if doing so furthers legitimate Article I
concerns.”).
119
Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71
HARV. L. REV. 1, 19-20 (1957).
120
McNally, 270 F.3d at pin.
121
But see O’Connor v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 770 F.Supp. 448, 452 (C.D. Ill. 1991) (“it is clear that
Congress could have preempted all state law and common law causes of actions involving nuclear incidents
or nuclear power under the commerce clause of Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution as
long as Congress provided an alternative remedy for potential plaintiffs.”) citing Duke Power Co. v. North
Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 87-89 (1978).
122
489 U.S. 121 (1989).
123
28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (2006).
124
Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136 (1989)
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way that it has, in fact, changed the underlying state law cause of action? The liability
cap does not change the remedy per se, it simply sets an upward limit on the damages
available to all litigants. In this way, the liability cap does not look terribly different from
the federal judicially created limits on punitive damages in state law lawsuits.125 On the
other hand, one might argue that the real force of substantive state law regulating primary
conduct lies in the ability of states to enforce these standards through the remedies they
impose.
It may also be understood as symptomatic of a growing hostility at the federal
level towards litigation. 126 Congress is authorized under Article III of the Constitution to
grant the federal courts jurisdiction over cases that arise under federal law. 127 Congress
has used this power to create a general grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts for all
cases “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States,” 128 although
this grant of jurisdiction is narrower than the constitutional limits because the federal
issue must appear of the face of the plaintiff’s well-pleaded complaint. 129 Congress can
also grant jurisdiction more directly by creating a substantive federal right or defense, and
affirmatively grant federal courts jurisdiction over its enforcement. 130
The ATSSSA prioritizes federal interests by ensuring a federal forum for the
litigation and by shaping the substantive rules of decision. 131 Professors Issacharoff and
Sharkey provide a useful model for understanding the interplay of jurisdiction and
preemption in the context of federalism. They suggest thinking of the problem as a twoby-two matrix with substantive and procedural dimensions. Actions by Congress to
“exert a federal interest” thus can be described as falling into one of four quadrants: “At
one pole are statutes . . . in which field preemption of the substantive law is accompanied
by exclusive federal-court jurisdiction. . . . At the other extreme are Dormant Commerce
125

See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996) (holding that “excessive”
punitive damage awards violate the due process clause of the U.S. Constitution). Of course, the punitive
damages issue does not raise the problem of protective jurisdiction because they are an example of partial
federalization in which some sort of federal law limits state law as applied in state court. See Issacharoff
and Sharkey, supra, note 132 at 1420-28.
126
See Conk, supra note 31 at pin; Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts: Hostility to
Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1097 (2006)
(“[T]he Court has shown its greatest sympathy for federalism doctrines that protect the states from
litigation and has shown almost no interest in developing new doctrines that provide states with greater
autonomy . . . if [it] could conceivably be used to create a more litigation-friendly environment.”);
Chemerinsky, supra note 91 at 1315 (“The Court has eagerly found preemption of state laws regulating
business. . . . most of [its] decisions invalidating federal laws have struck down civil rights laws.”).
127
U.S. Const. art. III § 2.
128
28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).
129
See, e.g., Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152, 29 S.Ct. 42, 43, 53 L.Ed.
126 (1908) (for the well-pleaded complaint rule); Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Construction Laborers
Vacation Trust for Southern Cal., 463 U.S. 1, 14, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 2848, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983) (“a case
may not be removed to federal court on the basis of a federal defense.”).
130
See 28 U.S.C. § 1330, §§ 1333-1365. Other specific grants of federal jurisdiction are “scattered
throughout the U.S. Code.” AMJUR Fed Courts § 1035.
131
Congress did not replace state law with a new regulatory regime, but it did change the application
of state law by instituting the liability cap. This “weak preemption” is discussed infra at Part XX.
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Clause cases in which the Court has to define the federal interest in the absence of
congressional action.” 132 ATSSSA falls, for the most part, into “Quadrant II,” the group
of cases in which Congress has decided to centralize jurisdiction in federal courts, but has
not established any substantive federal law to provide the rules of decision. 133
One recent illustration of the federalization of jurisdiction is the Class Action
Fairness Act (CAFA) 134 which authorized a substantial expansion of federal jurisdiction
over traditionally state law claims. CAFA’s proponents touted the statute as a national
remedy for class action “abuses” in state courts in which state law procedural devices
were blamed for empowering litigants to bring “nationwide” class actions in states with
plaintiff-friendly law. 135 Obtaining class certification in federal court under FRCP 23 is
perceived to be a more stringent standard. The statute allows for easier removal of class
actions to federal court by amending the diversity jurisdiction statute to allow minimal
diversity and an class-wide amount in controversy of $5 million. 136
CAFA is an example of a congressionally created widening of federal jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court has interpreted existing statutory and judge-made jurisdictional
doctrines to broaden federal jurisdiction. The Court recently resolved disputes about the
scope of diversity jurisdiction, 137 supplemental jurisdiction, 138 and the probate exception
to federal bankruptcy jurisdiction 139 in favor of a broader interpretation of each. In the
realm of arising under jurisdiction, the Court expanded the Merrell Dow doctrine for
determining when a well-pleaded complaint stated a federal cause of action.140 The

132

Samuel Issacharoff and Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353,
1357 (2006).
133
See Issacharoff and Sharkey, supra note 132 at 1415.
134
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (hereinafter “CAFA”), Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified
in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
135
See, e.g., NLJ Roundtable: Class Action Fairness Act, NAT’L L.J., May 16, 2005 at 18 (statement
of John Beisner, Partner, O’Melveny & Myers LLP); Issacharoff and Sharkey, supra note 132 at 1416
(CAFA reflects “broader concern about the need for federal oversight of legal claims that affect the entire
national market.”).
136
CAFA § 4(a)(2), 199 Stat. at 9 (adding new 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)).
137
See Wachovia Bank N.A. v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303 (2006) (holding that, for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction, a bank is located in the state where it has its main offices); Lincoln Property Co. v. Roche, 546
U.S. 81 (2005) (upholding diversity jurisdiction when named defendant is diverse but unnamed prospective
defendants are not).
138
Allapattah Services, Inc. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 545 U.S. 546 566-67 (2005)(“[T]he threshold
requirement of § 1367(a) is satisfied in cases . . . where some, but not all, of the plaintiffs in a diversity
action allege a sufficient amount in controversy. . . . § 1367 by its plain text . . . authorized supplemental
jurisdiction over all claims by diverse parties arising out of the same Article III case or controversy, subject
only to enumerated exceptions.”).
139
Marshall v. Marshall, 126 S. Ct. 1735 (2006).
140
Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005). This was a state
law quiet title action that involved the interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code. The Court confined the
holding to such “rare” state law cases that “involve[] contested issues of federal law” indicating that
“jurisdiction over actions like Grable’s would not materially affect, or threaten to affect, the normal
currents of litigation.” Id. at 320.
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Court narrowed the ability of lower courts to rely on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as a
tool of dismissing cases for lack of jurisdiction. 141
Protective jurisdiction is such a highly-charged concept because it sits at the
uncomfortable intersection of federal and state regulatory regimes. It has been suggested
that the Supreme Court does a disservice when it perpetuates the idea that regulatory and
adjudicatory spheres can be neatly divided between federal and state authority.
Lawmakers and judges should instead become more comfortable with the inescapable
reality that there are large “grey areas” of interjurisdictional competence in both the
hypothetical and real worlds. 142 The role of the courts should be to interpret and mediate
this space so that state and federal authorities can cooperate with certainty. On this view,
the exercise of protective jurisdiction and the ATSSSA promotes a sort of co-regulation
by state and federal authorities. 143 The state lawmakers retain their interest in defining
the primary conduct of actors within their jurisdiction. The federal lawmakers in turn
guard national interests by providing select litigants with the perceived advantages of a
federal forum and a backstop on remedies that could cripple an industry of national
importance. 144
Others might read the ATSSSA as a more sinister type of jurisdictional grant.
From this perspective, the statute, just like protective jurisdiction, is merely a way for the
federal government to pay lip service to state regulatory authority while imposing a
procedural regime that radically alters the outcome of lawsuits brought under the state
law in question. Moreover, it reflects an “eager endorsement of preemption doctrine . . .
when the federal rule preempts a state standard that regulates or restricts business or
commerce. 145 The ATSSSA does not purport to change any state law standards of
conduct, rather it consciously adopts them. The federal force is found in the limitation of
liability and the exclusivity of the federal forum. This sort of “stealth preemption” of
state law is in fact more pernicious than a traditional preemption of state law because
“[t]he authors of these proposals can thus call themselves ‘federalists’ and can declare
that states remain the font of [relevant state] law. It is only by looking deeper . . . that
one can begin to see how they might interfere with the states’ abilities to enforce and
make their own laws.” 146
This is the raw nerve that protective jurisdiction touches. It is as if the
commentators who analyze it are simply rehearsing the dogma that protective jurisdiction
by definition must be the adoption of a wholly state law claim. The constitutional and
141

Saudi Basic Indus. Corp. v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005).
See Erin Ryan, The Tug of War Within: Hurricane Katrina and Federalism Concerns, XX U.
MARYLAND L. REV. XXX (forthcoming 2007).
143
This is consistent with the calls by some academics for the recognition and further use of
multijurisdictional solutions. See Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: Allocating
Cases Between Federal and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211 (2004).
144
See generally Segall, supra note 8.
145
See Siegel, supra note 126 at 1168-70.
146
Wendy E. Parmet, Stealth Preemption: The Proposed Federalization of State Court Procedures, 44
VILL. L. REV. 1, 64-65 (1999) (arguing that federally mandated alterations to state court procedure are a
sort of “stealth preemption” of state law regimes).
142
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policy-oriented discomfort, however, has its source in the intuition that the state law
cause of action has somehow changed by virtue of its transformation into a federal cause
of action. Perhaps protective jurisdiction, then, is just preemption by another name, 147
another form of stealth preemption of state law. As one scholar cautions, “[s]tealth
preemption, though less visible than substantive preemption, is far more destructive of
our political system, precisely because it is so invisible and little understood.” 148
B. Event Jurisdiction
The jurisdictional puzzles and other practical problems that the ATSSSA created
cannot be attributed entirely to problem of protective jurisdiction, nor can they be
explained by the underlying worries that motivate criticism of that and other doctrines
concerning federal subject matter jurisdiction. The problem with the ATSSSA is that
Congress has engaged in a different sort of jurisdictional rationale that this Article labels
“Event Jurisdiction.”
In event jurisdiction, Congress has not decided that there is a type of conduct, or
industry, or type of cause of action that is of national importance and therefore deserving
of federal jurisdiction. Instead, Congress has chosen to understand a certain event as one
of national significance, and therefore in need of federal jurisdiction.
The problem with this approach is that it is unlikely that it is the event itself that is
the reason for lawsuits following thereafter. It is, rather, the harms that emerge as a
result of the event that give rise to the need for legal recourse. And these harms, though
related to and emerging from an event of national significance, may not themselves be
sort of harms that are the appropriate subjects of national regulation or a federal forum.
The ATSSSA is the first “fully active” instance of event jurisdiction, that is, Congress has
created federal jurisdiction based on an event and this has been followed by litigation.
There are, however, statutory provisions that under certain circumstances would produce
the result of event jurisdiction. For example, should the country experience a major
nuclear attack or accident, the litigation following such a disaster would take place in
federal court according to a statute that federalizes claims along event jurisdiction
principles. 149
Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, these areas of jurisdiction
are subject to two lines of inquiry: first, whether Congress has the constitutional authority
to grant the jurisdiction in question; and, second, whether it is a good idea as a policy
matter to expand federal jurisdiction to cover the class of cases at hand. Federal diversity
jurisdiction is a nice example of this analysis. Complete diversity is required for subject

147

See Judith Resnik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and
Federalism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1631-33 (2006) (arguing that “[t}oday’s foreign
affairs preemption has become so broad that it resembles what federal courts’ scholars call ‘protective
jurisdiction’.”).
148
Parment, supra note 146 at 3 (emphasis added).
149
Price Anderson Act. For a more detailed discussion, see infra notes 199-202 and accompanying
text.
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matter jurisdiction in ordinary state law cases litigated in federal court. 150 For certain
types of cases where Congress wants to ease access to federal courts, it has established
minimum diversity as the standard for meeting the subject matter jurisdiction
requirement. 151 Congress has the authority to grant create subject matter jurisdiction over
cases with minimum diversity, 152 but it is still worth debating whether such grants are
sensible as a policy matter. 153
Expansion of diversity jurisdiction enlarges the number of state law cases eligible
for litigation in a federal forum. Over the past few decades, scholars have proposed a
variety of methods for understanding the expanding grant of federal jurisdiction, as well
as increasing federal substantive regulation over a field that was traditionally considered
an area of state law competence. 154 Most of these theories assert that the emergence of
national markets for consumer products or financial securities, for example, warrant
uniform regulation, or at the very least, a judicial system capable of producing uniform
results in procedure. CAFA, for example, might reflect the fact that the class action
decision of one state court could have “spill-over effects” on the commerce and laws of
many other states. 155
Event jurisdiction, however, defies such analysis. At first blush, an event such as
a large-scale catastrophe might appear to be a solid reason for federalizing causes of
action. Catastrophes predictably generate litigation, and Congress might want to take
action to manage the scope of these cases. Like the legislators after September 11th,
lawmakers in the future might reasonably believe that by eliminating parallel litigation in
federal and state courts they would increase the efficiency of the litigation. With cases
150

28 U.S.C. § 1332; Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
For example, the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002 provides for expanded
federal jurisdiction over mass accident cases by loosening the diversity jurisdiction requirements. 28
U.S.C. § 1369(b) (2007).
152
See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 n.13 (1978).
153
For a comprehensive policy discussion of minimal diversity see C. Douglas Floyd, The Limits of
Minimal Diversity, 55 HASTINGS L. J. 613, 684-92 (2004).
154
See Harry N. Scheiber, Redesigning the Architecture of Federalism--An American Tradition: The
Devolution Proposals in Perspective, 14 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 227 (1996); Mark C. Gordon, Differing
Paradigms, Similar Flaws: Constructing a New Approach to Federalism in Congress and the Court, 14
Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 187 (1996); Judith Resnik, Afterword: Federalism’s Options, 14 Yale L. & Pol’y
Rev. 465 485-94 (1996) (tracking the development of and debate over boundaries between federal and state
authority); Richard Briffault, What About the “Ism?” Normative and Formal Concerns in Contemporary
Federalism, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1303 (1994) (preferring a structural account of federalism over an normative
or content-based view of the division of authority).
155
See Issacharoff and Sharkey, supra, note 132. See also C. Douglas Floyd, The Inadequacy of the
Interstate Commerce Justification for the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, 55 EMORY L. J. 487 (2006);
Michael H. Schill, Uniformity or Diversity: Residential Real Estate Finance in the 1990s and the
Implications of Changing Financial Markets, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261 (1991) (arguing that “preferences for
uniform national real estate law . . . seem out of place”). But see Resnik, supra note 154, at 482 (“Global
trading, national and transnational companies, national law firms, the Internet, a population of which 17
percent move annually and of which some 40 percent do not live in the state of their birth--none of these
are easily categorized as belonging either singularly to one state or exclusively to the national
government.”).
151
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proceeding in a single court system (and, possibly, before a single forum), Congress
could reduce the process costs associated with duplicative discovery, inconsistent rulings,
and a lack of uniformity across settlements and/or jury awards. Given that postcatastrophe litigation is likely to be both very extensive and highly visible, packaging the
cases together in a federal forum presumably would mitigate the high procedural costs
associated with sprawling litigation.
It is easy to see the national interest in protecting the aviation industry from
financial collapse in the personal injury and wrongful death cases. But it is harder to
articulate the federal interest in adjudicating a toxic tort that affects workers local to one
state or region. As the workers’ respiratory injury claims demonstrate, not every toxic
tort has the “spill-over” effects to neighboring states that would ordinarily prompt a call
for a national remedy or federal forum. The claims instead allege misconduct in the
supervision of a workplace, the regulation of which falls solidly in the realm of
traditional state functions. To the extent that one might suggest an enlarged national role
for regulation of the workplace torts, these arguments should be based upon a unified
account of workplace safety that involves national interests, not piecemeal instances of
workplace accidents that capture the national imagination.
Event jurisdiction robs litigants and courts of the ability to discern state and
national interests emerging from various aspects of a tragedy. Instead of focusing on an
analysis of what is appropriately federal and what is appropriately state, event jurisdiction
requires courts to engage first in an act of statutory interpretation. They will be forced to
decide what Congress meant when it defined the event in question, and they will then
have to decide how closely related the lawsuits are to the event. The answers to these
questions may or may not map onto a more logical understanding of what constitutes an
appropriate subject of federal regulation or federal forum. This might be because
Congress itself has not engaged in a meaningful debate about the implications of
expanding federal jurisdiction because it was focused on the national character of an
event rather than the interstate aspect of conduct to be regulated.
The flaw in this reasoning is that federalization of claims around the category of a
single event is very likely to be both over and under-inclusive. Event jurisdiction is overinclusive in the sense that it anticipates that certain cases are related when, as the
litigation unfolds, it turns out that they are not related in a manner that would normally
call for consolidation. As the September 11th litigation has shown, the harms resulting
from a single event produce results that affect different litigants in different ways. In the
event that these federalized claims are in fact consolidated before a single judge, this
might actually slow down rather than speed up the litigation process, as one group of
litigants must step aside while the judge addresses issues pertaining to other members of
the group. If the cases proceed before different judges, it appears that little has been
gained in the name of procedural efficiency by simply federalizing the cases. 156
Different trial courts would still require the intervention of an appellate court to ensure

156

The exception of course, is if Congress has created a substantive cause of action or a remedy that
somehow alters the state law regime in a manner that furthers some other interest.
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consistent decisions, and without an underlying substantive federal cause of action, the
difficult choice of law problems might prevent uniformity of outcomes anyhow. 157
Event jurisdiction is also likely to be under-inclusive because of litigants who
appear to have a only a tenuous relationship to the event in question, but whose claims
are actually related to those litigants whose claims have already been federalized. This is
especially likely to be true when a catastrophic event produces environmental damage
that is far-reaching both in time and in geography. These are claims that may (or may
not) benefit from consolidation, but are packaged together based on their relationship to
an event, rather than on their relationship to each other. So long as some cases remain in
state court and other are in federal court, the efficiency gains which Congress had hoped
for are lost, and process costs may in fact increase due to litigation over the scope of
subject matter jurisdiction.
Once the jurisdictional category has been drawn as a rigid rule set in reference to
a single event, the “relatedness” question becomes one of statutory interpretation, rather
than a function analysis of which cases would benefit from coordination. Statutory
interpretation is likely to be even more difficult in these cases since Congress presumably
passes such legislation in a hasty reaction to a devastating event. 158 The ATSSSA
illustrates this truncated process. As the Second Circuit observed, “[t]he legislative
history is understandably sparse, given the swiftness with which Congress acted after the
events of September 11; there apparently were no committee reports prior to ATSSSA's
initial passage, and only a conference committee report prior to the Act's amendment.” 159
The indeterminacy of the jurisdictional analysis is evident in the September 11th
litigation thus far. At the conclusion of its opinion in McNally, the Second Circuit
conceded that it did not have a clear answer to the question of what the jurisdictional
boundaries of this “event” were. As the off-site respiratory injury cases show, the
jurisdictional litigation is already doomed to repetition. Suppose that the district court or
the Second Circuit hold that injuries sustained by workers clearing debris and cleaning
buildings around lower Manhattan but not directly on the WTC site are not sufficiently
related to the events of September 11th so as to “arise from” the terrorist attacks as
required by the statute. That might be the appropriate interpretation of the ATSSSA
given its text and legislative history. The underlying claims themselves, however, seem
to be no different from the on-site cases, save for the fact that they occurred a few blocks
away. 160
These difficulties expose the problem inherent in federalizing claims arising out
of an event. The only way to avoid extensive litigation over the boundaries of
157

CAFA has been criticized for intensifying these sorts of choice of law problems. See Samuel
Issacharoff, Settled Expectations in a World of Unsettled Law: Choice of Law After the Class Action
Fairness Act, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1839 (2006).
158
For a broader analysis of the relationship between fear, risk perception and democratic governance,
see Cass R. Sunstein, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005).
159
414 F.3d at 376.
160
The one major difference is that the City is not a defendant in many of these cases. The fact of the
City’s presence as a defendant, however, hardly seems like an appropriate demarcation for where federal
jurisdiction should end and state court jurisdiction should begin.
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jurisdiction or to avoid a seemingly arbitrary division of cases between state and federal
court is to federalize an enormous swath of claims normally brought under state law in
state court. In doing so, the federal government may lose the ability to articulate sound
policy and constitutional arguments for the federalization of substance and forum.
III.

PROTECTIVE COORDINATION

The ATSSSA grants a federal forum for the group of cases arising out of the
events of September 11th and the attendant difficulties with the boundaries of this subject
matter jurisdiction are noted above. The ATSSSA also dictated the SDNY as a specific
venue for the cases and imposed a liability cap on the damages awarded, thus mandating
a consolidation of all litigation brought under the statute. This Part explores that
intersection between federalization and aggregation.
The first September 11th cases filed in the SDNY primarily alleged wrongful
death, personal injury, and property damage claims. With only a few exceptions, most
cases were filed in or removed to the SDNY. 161 After the first filed case was assigned to
Judge Hellerstein, the clerk of the court, either by his own determination, or by request of
the parties referred all other seemingly related cases to Judge Hellerstein. 162 This means
that, for the most part, the consolidation and coordination of September 11th cases
occurred ex ante, that is, before any cases were filed. This Part explores the contrast
between this approach and the more conventional ex post approach in which the litigants
or court personnel decide to coordinate a group of cases after they have been filed. Part
III.A outlines the normal legal tools for coordinating and consolidating cases for
litigation. Part III.B discusses the way in which venue is chosen or assigned. Part III.C
introduces the concept of “protective coordination” to show how ATSSSA deviates from
these rules and practices by deciding ex ante to coordinate a group of cases for litigation
and specifying in the text of the statute the judicial district which has exclusive
jurisdiction.
A. The Law of Coordination and Consolidation
Without an explicit statutory directive such as that found in the ATSSSA, the
process of aggregating cases is more complex. The most familiar mechanism for
aggregating what are, in fact, separate cases in complex litigation is the possibility of
consolidation of multi-district litigation for pre-trial purposes under 28 U.S.C. § 1407. 163
This statute authorizes that "when civil actions involving one or more common questions
of fact are pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any district for
coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.” 164 Under this statute, the cases
161

See, supra Part I.A.
See, infra notes 182-183 and accompanying text for an explanation of the internal transfer
procedures of federal district courts.
163
The class action law suit is the other major tool for organizing complex litigation in federal courts.
FRCP 23.
164
28 U.S.C. § 1407(a)(2006).
162
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involving the common questions of fact are referred to the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict
Litigation (JPML), which then decides whether or not to consolidate the cases for pretrial
purposes. 165 This practice is thought to serve the purposes of judicial economy by
avoiding duplicative discovery and motion practice in different jurisdictions. 166
The JPML consists of “seven circuit and district judges designated from time to
time by the Chief Justice of the United States, no two of whom shall be from the same
circuit.” 167 The JPML is responsible for identifying civil actions pending in different
federal courts involving one or more common questions of fact, 168 determining after
briefing and hearings whether any of those actions should be transferred to a single
district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings, 169 and then selecting the
judge or judges before whom the consolidated pretrial proceedings should be
conducted. 170
Section 1407 requires that the individual actions consolidated in an MDL must
involve “one or more common questions of fact.” 171 The JPML has also held that
common questions of law also justify the creation of an MDL. 172 The JPML must choose
the particular district for centralization, 173 and must also find that centralization serves
the interest of the parties and witnesses and promotes the just and efficient conduct of the
litigation. 174 The statute does not articulate a standard any more specific than these
broad interests which effectively function as a three-part test. 175
The JPML has adopted the practice of classifying its dockets into eight general
category areas: air and common disasters, antitrust, contract, employment practices,
patent and trademark, products liability, securities law, and miscellaneous. 176 Although
these categories are only labels for administrative efficiency, they present a good picture
of how the JPML understands multi-district litigation. Actions are mostly consolidated
165

Id. § 1407(??).
U.S. ex rel. Pogue v. Diabetes Treatment Centers of America, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d 270 (D.D.C.
2002). See also Richard L. Marcus, Symposium Article: Reassessing the Magnetic Pull of Megacases on
Procedure, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 457, 468-70 (2001)(summarizing the creation and purpose of the
multidistrict litigation statute).
167
28 U.S.C. § 1407(d)(2006).
168
The JPML may do this on its own initiative, 28 U.S.C. § 1407(c)(i), or upon motion of the parties.
28 U.S.C. § 1407(c)(ii).
169
28 U.S.C. § 1407(c) (2006).
170
28 U.S.C. § 1407(b) (2006).
171
28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2006). See, e.g. In re Ford Motor Co. Crown Victoria Police Interceptor
Products Liability Litigation, 259 F.Supp.2d 1366 (J.P.M.L. 2003).
172
In re Gator Corp. Software Trademark & Copyright Litigation, 259 F.Supp.2d 1378 (J.P.M.L.
2003).
173
Parties often contest which district should be chosen for an MDL.
174
In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation (No. VI), 771 F. Supp. 415 (J.P.M.L. 1991).
175
Mike Roberts, Multidistrict Litigation and the Judicial Panel, transfer and Tag-Along Orders
Prior to a Determination of Remand: Procedural and Substantive Problem or Effective Judicial Public
Policy?, 23 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 841, 847 (1993).
176
John F. Nangle, From the Horse’s Mouth: The Workings of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation, 66 DEF. COUNSEL J. 341, 342 (1999).
166

32

Effron

Event Jurisdiction and Protective Coordination
Forthcoming, Southern Cal. L. Rev. 2008

according to the type of cause of action or a single occurrence and not arranged around a
large event. The September 11th cases encompass much more than the category of “air
and common disaster.” Air and common disaster cases typically involve a group of
litigants that were all injured in the same discrete airplane crash or common carrier
accident. The JPML would probably not expect a products liability case or a toxic tort to
be litigated in the same manner as the wrongful death claims after the crash of an
airplane.
The JPML also has a continuing role in actions where the docket involves a large
number of cases filed over a lengthy period of time. After the JPML has ordered the
initial consolidation, cases filed in other district courts that appear to be related are
referred to the JPML as tag-along actions. If the panel agrees that the case is related
according to the criteria of the original consolidation it will transfer the case to join the
other for pre-trial consolidation. 177 The respiratory distress claims would probably be
handled in much the same manner had they been consolidated for pre-trial purposes by
the JPML in one judicial district. The question of whether the off-site respiratory
plaintiffs ought to join the on-site litigants would be subject to a much more functional
analysis, rather than to a completely separate and controlling question of statutory
interpretation, that is, whether the claims of the off-site litigants “arose from” the events
of September 11th in the same way as do the claims of the on-site litigants.
For the first thirty years of its existence, consolidation under the MDLA served as
a de facto transfer of all consolidated cases. Although Section 1407 states that cases
“[e]ach action so transferred shall be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion
of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred unless it shall
have been previously terminated,” 178 transferee courts used Sections 1404 and 1406 to
order the consolidated cases transferred permanently for trial. This practice drew
increasingly sharp criticism from academic commentators 179 until the Supreme Court
specifically barred the practice in 1998. 180 Commentators have debated the effectiveness
of the MDL as a consolidation tool since this time. One judge, for example, complained
that the Supreme Court “has substantially eviscerated the practical purposes of the MDL
assignments.” 181 The decision underscores the fact that actions consolidated pursuant to
Section 1407 are not class actions aggregated for motion practice and settlement by a
multi-judge panel instead of a single district judge pursuant to Rule 23. They are actions
with more limited commonalities that may require individual trials in different district
177

For example, the JPML oversees the continuing transfer of tag-along actions in “major ongoing
dockets” such as the asbestos and breast implant products liability litigations. See Nangle, supra note 176 at
342.
178
28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2006).
179
Practitioners, however, apparently did not question the practice. See Nangle, supra note 176 at 345
(“The so-called practice of ‘self-transfer’ has.
180
Lexecon v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998) (district court conducting
pretrial proceedings pursuant to § 1407 lacks authority to invoke 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to assign transferred
case to itself for trial).
181
Hearing on H.R. 2112 Before the Subcommitte on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 16, 1999).
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courts. In other words, had some of the September 11th personal injury and wrongful
death cases been consolidated by the JPML, they might have been transferred back to the
Eastern District of Virginia or another district for trial purposes.
The JPML is the primary vehicle for inter-district transfer of cases. Rule 42(a) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides a mechanism for intra-district
consolidation. 182 Because this rule is limited to cases already pending before a single
district, it is unlikely to be applied in large-scale cases attracting national attention. In
addition to the authority granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a), SDNY Local Rule 15 sets
forth the criteria for consolidating or coordinating civil cases. The rule states that “a civil
case will be deemed related to one or more other civil cases and will be transferred for
consolidation or coordinated pretrial proceedings when the interests of justice and
efficiency will be served. In determining relatedness, a judge will consider whether (i) a
substantial saving of judicial resources would result; or (ii) the just efficient and
economical conduct of the litigations would be advanced; or (iii) the convenience of the
parties or witnesses would be served.” 183 Local Rule 15 thus provides not only for the
more formal “consolidation” of cases of the type seen in § 1407 or Rule 42(a) actions, but
also for a looser and more informal “coordination” of cases which simply enables a
district judge who is familiar with the facts and issues of one case to preside over other
cases that are more or less related. The effect of such a local rule is to increase the
likelihood that cases consolidated in a single venue will be litigated before a single judge.
B. The Law of Transfer of Venue
The ATSSSA specifies the Southern District of New York as the exclusive venue
for all actions filed pursuant to the statute. Normally, in federal practice, venue is proper
in any judicial district in which any defendant resides, a substantial part of the events or
omissions giving rise to the claim occurred.184 When an action is brought in an improper
venue, the court can dismiss the case for improper venue, or transfer the case to any
district in which venue is proper. 185 If an action has been brought in a jurisdiction where
venue is proper, a party may still move for a transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) which
authorizes transfer from a proper venue “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses
[and] in the interests of justice.” 186
The party requesting the transfer of venue bears the burden of showing that a
balance of factors weighs in favor of transfer. 187 The district court judge enjoys broad
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a) (“When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending
before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may
order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend
to avoid unnecessary costs or delay.”).
183
SDNY Local Rule 15(a).
184
28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) and (b) (2006).
185
28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (2006).
186
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2006).
187
See, e.g., Shutte v. Armco Steel Corp., 431 F.2d 22, 25 (3d Cir. 1970), Chrysler Credit Corp. v.
Country Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 1509, 1515 (10th Cir. 1991).
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discretion in deciding whether to grant the transfer. 188 In making its decision, the district
court should consider the “enumerated” factors in the statute of convenience of parties,
convenience of witnesses, and the interests of justice. The analysis, however, is not
limited to these factors because “courts have recognized that such determinations require
a case-by-case evaluation of the particular circumstances at hand and a consideration of
all relevant factors.” 189
Several such factors likely would have been considered by a court faced with a
transfer of venue motion in a September 11th case. As the Third Circuit has noted, there
are both private and public interests to be considered. 190 Courts have stressed the high
importance of respect for the plaintiff’s choice of forum. 191 Other factors to be
considered include: “The accessibility of witnesses and other sources of proof, including
the availability of compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses; the cost of
making the necessary proof; questions as to the enforceability of a judgment if one is
obtained; relative advantages and obstacles to a fair trial; difficulties that may arise from
congested dockets; the possibility of the existence of questions arising in the area of
conflicts of laws; the advantage of have a local court determine questions of local law;
and all other considerations of a practical nature that make a trial easy, expeditious and
economical.” 192
C. Protective Coordination
The lawsuits brought pursuant to the ATSSSA landed in the SDNY by specific
instruction of the statute itself, not by judges using the standards for transfer of venue and
not by the JPML evaluating a proposed consolidation of cases for pre-trial purposes.
That feature of the ATSSSA has gone virtually unnoticed by practitioners and
commentators alike. Perhaps because Manhattan bore the brunt of the attacks, very few
thought to question the statutory assignment of venue. 193 It is, however, one of the most
striking features of the statute because it is so unprecedented. Never before has Congress
188

See, e.g., Filmline (Cross-Country) Productions, Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 865 F.2d 513, 528
(2d Cir. 1989).
189
Terra Intern, Inc. v. Mississippi Chemical Corp., 119 F.3d 688, 691 (8th Cir. 1997), citing Stewart
Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 29, 108 S.Ct. 2239, 2243-44, 101 L.Ed.2d 22 (1988).
190
Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 879 (3d Cir. 1995).
191
See, e.g., Shutte, 431 F.2d at 25 (“It is black letter law that a plaintiff’s choice of a proper forum is
a paramount consideration in any determination of a transfer request, and that choice ‘. . . should not be
lightly disturbed.’”) (citing Ungrund v. Cunningham Brothers, Inc., 300 F.Supp. 270, 272 (S.D.Ill. 1969)),
Texas Gulf Sulfer Co. v. Ritter, 371 F.2d 145, 147 (10th Cir. 1967) (“[U]nless the evidence and the
circumstances of the case are strongly in favor of the transfer the plaintiff’s choice of forum should not be
disturbed.”).
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Texas Gulf Sulfer Co. v. Ritter, 371 F.2d 145, 147 (10th Cir. 1967). See also, Terra Intern, Inc. v.
Mississippi Chemical Corp., 119 F.3d 688, 696 (8th Cir. 1997), Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d
873, 879-80 (3d Cir. 1995), Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 1509, 1516 (10th
Cir. 1991).
193
But see Elizabeth Berkowitz, The Problematic Role of the Special Master: Undermining the
Legitimacy of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, 24 Yale L. & Pol’y Rev. 1, 25 (2006) (“The
vesting of exclusive jurisdiction in the Southern District of New York poses a . . . problem.”).
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dictated such a specific venue for such a specific group of cases. Venue alone, however,
has not tied these cases together. The venue provision in combination with Local Rule 15
practically guaranteed that the cases would end up before a single judge. It is, however,
the statutory liability cap that ensured that the groups of cases would remain bound
together.
There is little question that before a single action had even been filed, Congress
made a conscious decision to consolidate all lawsuits arising out of the events of
September 11th. Senator Schumer emphasized that “[t]he intent here is to put all civil
suits arising from the tragic events of September 11 in the Southern District.” 194 Senator
McCain said “the bill attempts to provide some sense to the litigation by consolidating all
civil litigation arising from the terrorist attacks of September 11 in one court.”195 Senator
Hatch announced that he was “pleased that we consolidated the causes of action in one
Federal court.” 196 The motivation for such consolidation was clear: consolidating the
cases would “provide some sense” to the litigation; “ensure consistency to the judgments
awarded;” and make the litigation overall speedier and more efficient. 197
This method of controlling the course of litigation is unique in its specificity, but
it is not entirely detached from previous congressional action. 198 Congress has specified
venue through statutory means before. In addition to the general venue statute, Congress
has authorized specific venue criteria for certain entities or proceedings. 199 Sometimes a
statute that creates a federal cause of action will also specify venue. 200 The difference
between these statutes and the ATSSSA is that the former simply outline a standard by
describing where venue is proper, thus narrowing the very broad criteria of 28 U.S.C. §
1391, the general venue statute. They do not set venue outright by providing a strict rule
for a specific venue.
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Statement of Senator Schumer, 147 Cong. Rec. S9592 (Sept. 21, 2001).
Statement of Senator McCain. 147 Cong. Rec. S9594 (Sept. 21, 2001) (emphasis added).
196
Statement of Senator Hatch, 147 Cong. Rec. S9595 (Sept. 21, 2001) (emphasis added).
197
Id.
198
The phenomenon of protective coordination (especially as coupled with event jurisdiction) is not
limited to U.S. law. For example, after the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster of 1985, the parliament in India
passed a law called creating a special national court to process claims “arising out of, or connected with,
the disaster.” The government assumed the claims of all injured parties and the court was given the powers
of a normal civil court. The Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of claims) Act, No. 21, 1985.
199
For example, 28 U.S.C. § 1394 is the special statute for national banks, stating that “[a]ny civil
action by a national banking association to enjoin the Comptroller of the Currency, under the provisions of
any Act of Congress relating to such associations, may be prosecuted in the judicial district where such
association is located.” See also 28 U.S.C. § 1391(d) (aliens); 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (defendant is an officer
or employee of the United States); 28 U.S.C. § 1391(f) (action against foreign state); 28 U.S.C. § 1395
(fine, penalty, or forfeiture); 28 U.S.C. § 1396 (Internal Revenue taxes); 28 U.S.C. § 1397 (interpleader);
28 U.S.C. § 1398 (Interstate Commerce Commission orders); 28 U.S.C. § 1399 (partition action involving
United States); 28 U.S.C. § 1400 (patents and copyrights); 28 U.S.C. § 1401 (stockholder's derivative
actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1402 (United States as defendant); 28 U.S.C. § 1403 (eminent domain).
200
See, e.g., the Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2110(n)(2)(2006); the National Childhood Vaccine
Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa, et seq..
195
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This Article labels this sort of congressional action “protective coordination”
because, like protective jurisdiction, it demonstrates a congressional will to shape the
course of certain litigation according to particular federal interests. It does this by tying
together certain causes of action and ensuring that they will be litigated together in a
single district court, or by tying the outcomes of the cases together with a common
denominator such as the liability cap.
Protective coordination can be understood as a strong form of the methods that
Congress employs for tying cases together for litigation purposes. Imagine a spectrum
where Congressional coordination of litigation runs from weak to strong. At one end are
the very weak tools for coordinating multiple causes of action such as 28 U.S.C. § 1367
(supplemental jurisdiction), the specific venue statutes listed above, and the tendency for
Congress to concentrate appeals from certain administrative actions in the D.C. Circuit.
These statutes make it likely or even mandatory that certain types of cases will be filed in
the same judicial district, but not necessarily as a coordinated litigation. In the middle of
the spectrum one finds such tools as 28 U.S.C. § 1407, coordination for pre-trial purposes
which was a direct congressional answer to cries for a more efficient means to prepare
large numbers of complex actions for trial or settlement. Other examples might be the
statutory provisions which allows a bankruptcy court to hear causes of action on related
matters, 201 the statutory and rule interpleader options for stakeholder actions, 202 or the
Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act. 203
These stronger methods of
coordination are tools that Congress has made available to litigants but they do not
mandate a coordination, instead they encourage the litigation to take shape in a certain
way. The tools of protective coordination are much stronger because they act to identify a
specific type of cases brought by identifiable litigants and because they specify or
narrowly describe the judicial district in which the lawsuits must be brought. One
example of protective coordination is the jurisdiction provision of the Price-Anderson
Act. 204 As noted above, this is not a choice that Congress makes very often.
201

Interestingly, some commentators believe that this aspect of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction raises
protective jurisdiction problems. See, e.g., Thomas Galligan, Jr., Article III and “Related to” Bankruptcy
Jurisdiction: A Case Study in Protective Jurisdiction, 11 PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1 (1987). But see
Goldberg-Ambrose, supra, note 103 at 551-58 (arguing that such bankruptcy jurisdiction is not an instance
of protective jurisdiction).
202
Fed. R. Civ. P. 22; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 1397, 2361 (2007).
203
28 U.S.C. § 1369.
204
42 U.S.C §§ 2110(n)(2) (2007) (
With respect to any public liability action arising out of or resulting from a
nuclear incident, the United States district court in the district where the nuclear incident
takes place, or in the case of a nuclear incident taking place outside the United States, the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, shall have original jurisdiction
without regard to the citizenship of any party or the amount in controversy. Upon motion
of the defendant or of the Commission or the Secretary, as appropriate, any such action
pending in any State court (including any such action pending on the date of the
enactment of the Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 1988 [enacted Aug. 20, 1988]) or
United States district court shall be removed or transferred to the United States district
court having venue under this subsection.)

37

Effron

Event Jurisdiction and Protective Coordination
Forthcoming, Southern Cal. L. Rev. 2008

The ATSSSA illustrates the features of protective coordination: Congress has
identified a distinct class of cases and litigants and has directed them to a specific forum.
Three aspects of the Act reinforce the strength of the protective coordination effect. First,
Congress created a federal cause of action, ensuring that all lawsuits, not just those
amenable to federal jurisdiction would be eligible at the outset for consolidation in one
judicial forum. Therefore, it is not a coincidence that the ideas of event jurisdiction and
protective coordination are linked in the context of the ATSSSA; once Congress
concluded that all September 11th litigation should be coordinated, federalization of all
claims relating to that event was a necessary step. As a second feature, the statute names
the SDNY specifically as the forum for all cases. 205 Third, Congress ensured the
coordination of the cases by limiting the remedy for all cases to the available liability
insurance. This liability cap creates a “fixed pie” of available damages, tying the claims
brought under the statute together almost as if it were an interpleader action.
One way of thinking about protective coordination is to divide the tools for
coordinating litigation into ex ante and ex post methods. Most lawsuits are coordinated
ex post, that is, after they have been filed. In protective coordination, the decision to
consolidate is made before any party sets foot in court. The ATSSSA is a stark
illustration of how Congress can achieve an ex ante coordination of cases and the utility
of employing this method of litigation coordination.
This Article does not argue that protective coordination is beyond the reach of
Congress’s authority. The ex ante/ex post distinction, however, raises questions of
institutional competence. Just because Congress can dictate the ex ante coordination of
lawsuits does not mean that it is wise to do so.
Another dimension of the ex ante/ex post approach to consolidation is the degree
to which a statute mandates a specific consolidation result. In the ex ante approach,
Congress dictates a rule, subject to little or no interpretation, and with a mandatory result.
In the ex post approach, cases are consolidated according to a standard that Congress has
dictated, and according to which, any number of aggregation and/or venue choices are
possible. This distinction goes beyond a simple rules/standards dichotomy. Note, for
example, that the ATSSSA gives a rule (venue must be in the SDNY) whereas the PriceAnderson Act gives a standard (venue must be where nuclear accident took place), but
both mandate a specific judicial district as a result. Contrast this with the general venue
statute in which venue may be proper in any number of judicial districts. In other words,
the hallmark of the ex post approach is that it delivers a standard under which multiple
parties and institutions with the best information about the cases negotiate a result which
is one of many lawful possibilities.
In the ex post approach, the standards for coordinating cases either by transfer of
venue, intra-jurisdictional transfer under Rule 42(a), or inter-jurisdictional transfer by the
JPML are very fluid. It is not surprising that, in the end, Congress has directed the judge
or panel to approve or deny a consolidation according to a dynamic balancing test of
205

The Price-Anderson Act, by comparison, specifies the forum as “the United States district court in
the district where the nuclear incident takes place,” making more than one venue a lawful possibility for
jurisdiction after a nuclear accident.
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several factors, one of them being the malleable “in the interest of justice” standard. The
decision to consolidate cases and the choice of forum for the consolidation are extremely
context sensitive. Judges are in a much better position to make this decision than
Congress because they have the contours of the existing litigation before them, and they
have the interested parties as advocates for a variety of positions.
The course of the September 11th litigation demonstrates the weakness in the ex
ante approach. In just five years, the September 11th cases have mutated from the single
designation “In re September 11th Litigation” to five separate tracks of cases, a path that
surprised the judge and litigants alike. 206 Moreover, these tracks of cases do not seem
particularly well-suited to consolidation—that is precisely why they were broken up in
the first place. The legal and factual issues in a complex aviation disaster turn out to be
quite different from those in an environmental toxic tort, which are, in turn, different
from an insurance dispute. In the ex ante approach, Congress is expected to anticipate
the scope of the cases and the types of harms that will arise out of one event such as
“September 11th Terrorist Attack” or one description such as “nuclear incident.” This
expectation is quite optimistic given that the litigants themselves did not realize the full
scope of the cases until a few years after the event in question. A poorly informed
judgment about the scope of consolidation may also carry some costs. Once a group of
cases has started to proceed before a certain judge it may be costly to break off one or
more groups of cases and transfer them to another judge or another judicial district which
must then familiarize itself with the case. In other words, a faulty ex ante aggregation by
Congress may fail to deliver on reducing process costs, and in fact may burden litigants
and the courts with the additional costs of “disaggregation.”
The nature of toxic tort cases further dampens Congress’s ability to accurately
foresee the scope of litigation and the advisability of consolidation. Toxic tort cases
necessarily involve complex theories of causation that change from plaintiff to plaintiff.
They present novel scientific problems. Most importantly, the existence of a toxic tort at
all might not be apparent until months or even years after the incident in question. The
September 11th cases demonstrate that the largest number of plaintiffs may not appear
until well after the some litigation for harms arising out of an event has already
commenced. 207 In that case, the latent nature of the harm effectively excluded them from
the VCF, leaving the plaintiffs only with a litigation option that Congress explicitly
meant to discourage. In some cases latent harms might not appear for even longer. For
example, the harms to pregnant women may not be apparent until well after children have
been born.
The September 11th cases also show the difficulty of consolidating the cases
before one judge. The ATSSSA itself does not mandate this result, but the statute
worked in tandem with the local SDNY rules to create this predictable outcome. Having
designated all cases arising out of the events of September 11th as one federal cause of
action, it is not surprising that court personnel assumed that all actions so filed were
related with little thought otherwise. Once assigned, the judge must administer a heavy
206
207

See, supra, notes 37-80 and accompanying text.
See Eggen, supra note 29.
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load of cases. The burden is not so much in numbers—many judges do a remarkable job
in administering large MDLs over very long periods of time. 208 The difficulty is, instead
found in the fact that the judge must direct his attention to many different cases with
strikingly different needs and organizational complexities. Moreover, even assuming that
the groups of cases were more related than they are, it remains a fact that a judge can, as
a practical matter, only manage one trial at a time. District judges have other cases on
their docket that require trial time, most notably, criminal defendants with speedy trial
rights. Therefore, the groups of cases might wait an even longer time for trial than would
normally be expected. This is evident in the September 11th cases. A September 11th
insurance coverage dispute has already gone to trial,209 and a few actions filed after
Hurricane Katrina have gone to trial. 210 The cases filed pursuant to the ATSSSA are not
even close to trial. 211
Finally, judges will be left with the task of interpreting the statute that mandates
consolidation. Some aspects of this might be very clear, such as the choice of SDNY as
the forum. Others, however, could be very ambiguous, such as the designation of the
class of cases. The interpretive problems described in Part II.B apply with equal force to
the problem of Protective Coordination: the answer to the question, “Which cases did
Congress mean to consolidate?” might be very different from the answer to the question,
“Which cases does it make sense to consolidate?”
Judges and litigants also have the luxury of time to craft nuanced and creative
solutions to the organization of complex litigation. Congress, in creating a consolidation
ex ante, is necessarily acting hastily, passing a bill with even less scrutiny and debate
than normal. This is yet another institutional deficiency.
The success of the ATSSSA protective coordination goal can be measured by the
standards of those who wrote the statute. The record shows that Congress wanted to
consolidate these cases because that would provide the most efficient resolution and
would ensure consistency in awards. Judged on its own terms, ATSSSA has been, at
best, equally effective at achieving these goals as traditional consolidation methods might
have done, and it has most likely made things worse.
The choice to federalize all causes of action might have been an effort to ensure
consistency in litigation process and awards, but it is not clear that this has been effective.
The courts have been occupied with tricky jurisdictional issues that have delayed the start
of discovery and organization of the group. It might turn out that, in the end, some cases
that look very related to the respiratory distress cases are litigated in state court anyway.
208

See, e.g., In re Agent Orange Litigation consolidated before Judge Weinstein in the Eastern District
of New York.
209
See action before Judge Casey.
210
Judge Senter in the Southern District of Mississippi has already conducted one trial in one of the
consolidated actions regarding denial of coverage by insurance companies. See Mitchell F. Crusto, The
Katrina Fund: Repairing Breaches in Gulf Coast Insurance Levees, 43 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 329, 329-339
(2006) (providing overview of Hurricane Katrina insurance litigation); Allen Kanner, Louisiana Insurance
Litigation Following Katrina and Rita, 1 ANN.2006 ATLA-CLE 589 (2006) (same).
211
It is important to remember that other factors contribute to this situation, namely, the discovery
difficulties cause by SSI materials. See, supra, Part I.E.
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If this is not true, and a vast number of these cases remain before Judge Hellerstein, this
might be at a high cost to some basic federalism values.
The choice to dictate the SDNY as venue has had, at best, a neutral effect on the
litigation. For many lawsuits, the SDNY was probably the obvious choice of forum, but
the victims of the attacks came from many other states and countries. 212 Even if the
lawsuits brought by these personal injury and wrongful death plaintiffs were consolidated
for pre-trial purposes, the recent Supreme Court ruling makes it more likely that they still
might have been able to litigate a good portion of the case in the forum of their choice. 213
Finally, the ATSSSA itself mandates that “[t]he substantive law for decision in any such
suit shall be derived from the law, including choice of law principles, of the State in
which the crash occurred.” 214 Because this involves three states, it may be that the JPML
or a judge considering transfer of some cases would conclude that the questions of law
are not uniform enough for consolidation. 215
For others, it is unlikely that the process of transferring some personal
injury/wrongful death cases from the Eastern District of Virginia (Pentagon cases) would
have been particularly onerous. Some of the respiratory distress cases might have been
filed in the Eastern District of New York or the District of New Jersey. If anything, the
exclusive jurisdiction of the SDNY led the parties and court personnel to an immediate
conclusion of relatedness of cases that resulted in the consolidation of all of these cases
before a single judge, not just a single district.
The choice to establish the liability cap might be the most damaging decision of
all, for this has tied the cases together in resolution as well as in litigation. The resolution
of a toxic tort that affects a large number of plaintiffs over a long period of time will have
very different trial and settlement dynamics than an air and common disaster where both
plaintiffs and damages are known. 216 Despite this, all litigants are forced to divide the
same pie. This has had the overall effect of slowing down the litigation, not making it
speedier or more efficient. 217

212

As one commentator has observed, “[c]onvenience, in the doctrine of forum non conveniens, has
always been a part of venue determinations. The September 11 attacks involved travelers from all over the
country, yet Congress did not consider the difficulties many of the families would face participating in
lengthy trials in New York City.” Berkowitz, supra note 193 at 25.
213
See, supra notes 180-181 and accompanying text.
214
ATSSSA § 408(b)(2).
215
For example, Virginia law allows hedonic damages for pre-impact emotional distress, whereas
New York law does not. See Gonzalez v. New York City Hous. Auth., 572 N.E.2d 598, 600- 01 (N.Y.
1991); .Y Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 11-3.2(b) (McKinney 2007).
The problem of uniformity of law at the nexus of federalization of forum and aggregation of claims is
not unique to this situation. As several commentators have noted, CAFA has presented similar difficulties.
216
Examples of liability cap design from other federal statutes are discussed in greater detail infra at
Part IV.C.
217
It will be interesting to see whether the bifurcated trial on damages only in six of the personal
injury/wrongful death cases will do anything to advance the overall resolution of that track of the litigation.
See supra note 26.

41

Effron

Event Jurisdiction and Protective Coordination
Forthcoming, Southern Cal. L. Rev. 2008
IV.

LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE

The September 11th litigation experience shows that there are lessons to be learned
from the ATSSSA aside from the debates over the propriety of any future compensation
fund such as the VCF. This Article has evaluated the Act as an overall statutory response
to the specter of litigation in the wake of a large disaster. This Part draws together the
specific problems of the ATSSSA with the larger concepts of protective coordination and
event jurisdiction to suggest a framework for how Congress should consider drafting this
sort of legislation—if at all—in the future. In this Part, some more recent experiences in
post-catastrophe litigation from Hurricane Katrina 218 are used as a counterpoint to the
September 11th experience. While these events are not completely analogous, there are
several similarities from the perspective of post-disaster litigation worth examining
because the Katrina litigation provides a noteworthy window into the course of postdisaster litigation that is proceeding in the absence of any event-based Congressional
action coordinating the litigation by assignment of venue or federalization of claims. 219
A. Reflections on the Absence of Congressional Action on Post-Disaster
Litigation Matters

218

For purposes of this Article, the focus remains on Hurricane Katrina, and avoids the question of
whether Hurricane Rita might have been a separate “event.” Litigation that concerns both hurricanes is
noted throughout.
219
The catastrophes of September 11th and Hurricane Katrina are events that deserve to be analyzed
on their own terms, and this Article does not purport to equate the very different dimensions and
experiences of devastation and suffering that each event caused. It is, in fact, one of this Article’s principal
contentions that all catastrophic events are disastrous in their own disastrous way. The following
similarities highlight only what is comparable from a post-disaster litigation perspective.
Both events were sudden disasters, but only arguably unexpected—that the World Trade Center was a
terrorist target and that a powerful Hurricane could hit the Gulf Coast were not unknown possibilities.
Both caused shocking loss of human life, personal injury, and severe property damage. Both were
initiated by forces that are more or less beyond the reach of a litigation remedy—the terrorists and their
backers who orchestrated September 11th and the forces of nature that produced the Hurricane. Suing the
terrorists and their financial backers has proved remarkably difficult. And although one might find it rather
counterintuitive to “sue the weather,” there is indeed a class action lawsuit pending against oil companies
for actions leading to the global warming alleged to have produced the Hurricane of such striking force.
See Comer v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 1:05:-cv-00436-LG-RHW (S.D. Miss. Sept. 30, 2005).
Moreover, causation of the damage in each event is riddled with intervening or contributing
actions of third party actors well within the reach of litigation. The alleged negligence of the aviation
defendants and WTC owners and operators in the case of September 11th, and the weak levee in New
Orleans are only the most obvious examples.
Finally, both were undisputedly “national” events. Although the damage to person and property was
local in each case, the whole nation felt the economic and political consequences of each. Moreover,
coverage of the aftermath captivated the public’s attention and prompted an outpouring of charitable relief.
The backdrop for litigation was thus set after each event: a large number of parties would seek
redress for a wide variety of claims following an event that played out on the national stage.
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One possibility for a Congressional response is for Congress not to act with
respect to the litigation options for victims of a national catastrophe. Plaintiffs would be
left to pursue traditional state and federal remedies unaltered by an event-specific statute,
or a statute dictating the aggregation of claims. This approach has the advantage of
avoiding the jurisdictional and organizational challenges that the ATSSSA has created in
the September 11th litigation. On the other hand, the lawsuits would be spread across a
number of federal and state jurisdictions and this may lead to the familiar problems of
duplicative discovery, inconsistent applications of law and inconsistency in awards or
settlements. The JPML could be called upon to consolidate like cases in one district for
pre-trial proceedings but could not alter the allocation of cases in both federal and state
courts. It is a difficult counterfactual question to imagine whether these problems would
be more of a hindrance in the September 11th litigation than the problems caused by the
ATSSSA. The Hurricane Katrina litigation, however, provides a picture of how multijurisdictional post-disaster litigation looks.
The post-Katrina litigation is multi-jurisdictional, taking place across three states
and at the federal and state level. Since Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas were all hit by
the hurricane, it is not surprising that plaintiffs filed lawsuits in their home jurisdiction.220
The cases filed include class actions, individual actions, and individual actions
consolidated in a particular venue for pretrial coordination. The litigation thus far has
concerned tort claims and actions against insurance providers for coverage of damage
sustained as a result of the storm. There is a possibility that, as in the case of the
September 11th litigation, a “second generation” of toxic tort cases will emerge in the
more distant aftermath of the hurricane. Possible claims include those brought by
plaintiffs seeking compensation for damage to person and property caused by the mold
that has flourished in the affected areas. 221 Landfills and debris removal programs are
another potential source of environmental hazard and future litigation. 222
220

One commentator has noted the effect of geography on the nature of claims filed:
Mississippi’s southern counties directly abut the sea, with no man-made barriers to
separate them from the 30-foot storm surge that moved ashore. Residential areas,
gambling barges, hotels, and small towns simply collapsed under the blow. Primary
litigation issues there involve who will pay to repair the damage cause by an act of nature
alone—largely disputes with insurers over coverage.
Louisiana presented different geography and industries. Man, not nature, played a far
larger role. Consequently, the tort system occupies a far greater role in sorting out the
question of who will pay.
John P. Manard, Jr., Patrick O’Hara, Kelly R. Blackwood, Katrina’s Tort Litigation: An Imperfect
Storm, 20 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 31, 33 (2006).
221
See Manard, supra note 220 at 37 (
“[I]t would not be surprising to see mold litigation in future years based upon the
contention that the steps taken to eliminate mold proved to be inadequate, thus exposing
people to harmful mold in the air. Landlord/tenant situations would seem to provide the
more likely scenarios. Commercial enterprises could also be at risk for exposure of
employees or customers.”).
222
See Manard, supra note 220 at 37 (“[S]uch large-scale waste disposal in this type of wetlands
environment might well be expected to involve waste sites that will generate litigation in future years,
particularly if the areas around them are repopulated.”).
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At present, the claims emerge from several different groups of plaintiffs who have
identified different types of damages and different sources of harm. Many of the lawsuits
involve damage allegedly caused by the failure of the levees and floodwalls. Cases were
filed in state and federal court, and defendants removed many of the state cases to the
Eastern District of Louisiana. The en banc court of the district determined that all related
cases should be consolidated before Judge Stanwood R. Duval, Jr. and bear the caption
“In re: Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation.”223
Despite the consolidation the issue remains multi-jurisdictional since there is no
federal statute like ATSSSA to grant federal jurisdiction and specify venue. Therefore,
many of these cases remain in state court. 224 The judges and litigants recognize,
nonetheless, the importance of coordination “to reduce needless duplication and
streamline discovery.” 225 As a result, Judge Duval is involving the state court judges in
the relevant federal proceedings. They have attended status conferences and have
“recognized the efficacy of creating coordinating [sic] discovery and agreed to review the
proposed schedule, comment thereon to this Court, and with its adoption by this Court, to
present the First Discovery Plan to their respective en banc courts for possible
adoption.” 226 As of the writing of this article, this cooperation between state and federal
court in this disaster litigation is just beginning. The results for coordination of efforts
within the context of the traditional federal division of cases look promising.
The Katrina experience thus far shows that a status quo approach to post-disaster
litigation does not guarantee chaos in the litigation environment. Post-disaster litigation
may be seen as one of many contexts in which judges and law-makers must navigate
solutions to the reality that in a federal system of dual sovereignties there will be
overlapping adjudicative efforts. 227 The answers here lie in creative approaches to
interjurisdictional cooperation. 228 The Hurricane Katrina litigation will inevitably have
223

See C.A. No. 05-CV-4182,Order of February __, 2006. The consolidated cases concern damages
involving the 17th Street Canal, the London Avenue Canal, the Industrial Canal, and the Mississippi Gulf
River Outlet. The court identifies two factors as common among all of the claims: “[T]he recourse sought
involves a determination as to whether the failing of a specific levee or levees was caused by negligent
design, construction or maintenance. A corollary to this issue is whether the water damage exclusion in allrisk insurance policies apply to these damages.” http://www.laed.uscourts.gov/CanalCases (last visited on
March 7, 2007).
224
Mixed jurisdictional results also occur in the insurance cases. See infra TAN.
225
In re: Katrina Canal Breaches Consolidated Litigation, Minute Entry of January 11, 2007. The
court further noted that “any discovery concerning the United States Government must ultimately be
overseen by this district court” and that “the overall cost of this litigation could be greatly diminished by
establishing certain protocols, creating discovery depositories and allowing discovery conducted in the
federal litigation to be used in the state court proceedings.” Id.
226
Id.
227
See Resnik, supra note 154, at 498 (“That state and federal courts overlap to a large extent is not
surprising when one remembers that courts’ dockets reflect the overlapping work of the state and federal
governments.”).
228 A number of commentators have written about the possibilities of cooperative
federalism in the judicial context. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 154 (describing cooperative
federalism efforts and noting that “[t]he practice of these judges and lawyers . . . all crisscross state and
federal lines but are not in focus in United States legal federalism.”); Judith Resnik, History, Jurisdiction,
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its own surprises and difficulties. It will not, however, be plagued with the problems that
the jurisdictional aspects of the ATSSSA has caused in the September 11th litigation.
The status quo approach by itself also means, however, that two of Congress’
concerns from the aftermath of September 11th remain unaddressed: a need to show a
“national” response to victims of a national tragedy, and the need to relieve a sensitive
industry from potentially crippling liability. It is possible, however, for Congress to
address these concerns without altering the status quo of litigation options. It is possible,
for example, to imagine that the ATSSSA had retained the VCF entirely while remaining
silent about the content of the litigation options. It is also possible to envision different
ways in which Congress could have approached the perceived problem of liability of the
aviation defendants, for example, by providing tax cuts, direct industry subsidies, or by
having the U.S. government itself assume vicarious liability for all damages. 229

B. Lessons on the Federalization of Forum and Underlying Substantive
Causes of Action
When Congress passed ATSSSA it was believed that the creation of an exclusive
federal forum would bring with it certain benefits of speed and efficiency. 230 The
September 11th litigation has shown that this tactic can create problems of its own. To
the extent that Congress still wants to provide a federal forum or to ensure that all claims
would be litigated at the federal and not state level, the ATSSSA experience points to
some suggestions for less problematic ways to achieve those goals.
Such a statute should be drafted to avoid the problems of event jurisdiction.
Although a specific event might be the impetus for Congress to pass the legislation at
issue, it should resist the urge to use that event as a blanket basis for federal jurisdiction.
Instead, the statute should address itself to specific classes or types of claims. This sort
of drafting should force legislators to decide and articulate upfront exactly what sort of
lawsuits they wish to take place in a federal forum, and should help avoid the problems of
line-drawing that judges have experienced in attempting to determine the proper
boundaries of jurisdiction in the September 11th respiratory injury cases. One strategy
might be to have the jurisdictional categories outlined in the legislation align more
and the Federal Courts: Changing Contexts, Selective Memories, and Limited Imagination, 98 W. Va. L.
Rev. 171 (1995); William W. Schwarzer, Alan Hirsch, & Edward Sussman, Judicial Federalism: A
Proposal to Amend the Multidistrict Litigation Statute to Permit Discovery Coordination of Large-Scale
Litigation Pending in State and Federal Courts, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1529 (1994) (proposing inter alia to
amend the multidistrict litigation statute to provide for limited removal of state court cases to federal court
for coordinated discovery procedures); William W. Schwarzer, Nancy E. Weiss & Alan Hirsch, Judicial
Federalsim in Action: Coordination of Litigation in State and Federal Courts, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1689 (1992)
(detailing several recent examples of cooperative federalism in complex litigation); Ralph I. Lancaster &
Catherine R. Connors, Creation of a National Disaster Court: A Response to “Judicial Federalism In
Action” 78 Va. L. Rev. 1753 (1992).
229
This is the government’s strategy in statutes addressing other areas of public health or disaster
management. See, infra, notes 245-251 and accompanying text.
230
See, supra notes 194-197 and accompanying text.
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closely with the underlying categories of substantive law of the claims to be federalized.
Furthermore, when authorizing a federal forum in such cases, legislators should also
remain keenly aware of the problem of protective jurisdiction. Although an event is itself
a poor organizing concept for determining the boundaries of jurisdiction, an event of
national importance and its aftermath may be useful in articulating or justifying a federal
basis of jurisdiction while retaining state law for the substantive rules of decision.
Additionally, legislators should consider seriously whether a very specific venue
provision such as the SDNY mandate from ATSSSA is necessary. This Article has
demonstrated the perils of such ex ante decisions to consolidate litigation in one judicial
district. To the extent that it would make sense to litigate certain claims together, the
parties and district judges can avail themselves of JPML procedure to attain a
consolidation in one district for pretrial purposes. In the event that Congress once again
passes such a venue mandate, it will become important for the district court judges and
personnel to be aware of how this statutory scheme interacts with the local rules. This
Article has shown how the combination of the ATSSSA venue provision with the SDNY
local rules led to an assignment of many tracks of cases to one judge as “related,” when it
turns out that they were not necessarily so. The court personnel should be particularly
attentive to issues of relatedness in these sorts of cases.
One way for Congress to ensure that a future statute is not vulnerable to attack on
protective jurisdiction grounds is to infuse the law with more substantive measures. 231
As the ATSSSA shows, it is possible for Congress to alter parties’ substantive rights in
litigation without creating completely new causes of action.
There is already a substantial debate about how much, if at all, the federal
government ought to alter the traditional state law remedies available to litigants in
ordinary litigation. These considerations would surely play a role in the design of any
substantive law measures. The contribution of this Article, however, is to note that such
substantive additions should be crafted to avoid the litigation problems that have arisen in
the September 11th litigation.
In addition to any lessons about substantive remedies, it is here at the intersection
of federalization of forum and federalization of substantive law that the nexus between
event jurisdiction and protective coordination is most apparent. When Congress desires
for a group of cases to be litigated together, it will first need to create an exclusive federal
cause of action to ensure complete aggregation. If aggregation of cases is the motivating
force behind this federalization, then it is not surprising that Congress would use the
language and thought process behind aggregation to shape the contours of the
federalization of forum. The experience of the September 11th litigation, however,
demonstrates the ways in which the desire to aggregate cases around the causation
concept of an event creates a problematic jurisdictional category.

C. Reflections on the Use and Design of Liability Caps
231

See, supra, Part II.A.
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The September 11th litigation has shown how problematic a blanket liability cap
on damages can be, especially when it is combined with the amorphous group of cases
defined by an event jurisdiction concept. The lesson from the liability cap experience is
this: Congress should avoid employing substantive remedies that have the effect of tying
together large and potentially unforeseen groups of cases. If legislators have determined
that a certain event necessitates the limitation of liability in a particular industry, these
liability limitations should be tailored to meet that purpose only. And if legislators favor
a broad-scale liability cap with the potential of tying disparate groups of cases together, it
should more thoroughly consider the options for handling the problem of future
claimants.
i. Industry- or Claim-Specific Liability Caps
A few examples of industry- or claim-specific liability caps exist, as well as
liability cap schemes that are more event-oriented. The Price-Anderson Act sets out a
liability cap scheme that most resembles the ATSSSA, and like the ATSSSA, its aim is to
control potentially unwieldy litigation in the wake of a catastrophic event. PriceAnderson is a useful comparison both in its current form and in terms of various
proposals that have been made to amend its liability cap provisions.
Like the ATSSSA, the Price-Anderson liability cap scheme is based on a
combination of capped private liability against a background of government contribution
and a process for expedited processing of victims’ claims. Liability is limited to a set
amount of liability insurance that nuclear contractors are obligated to purchase, plus a
guaranteed indemnification by the U.S. government. 232 Although the Act serves to put a
distinct dollar limit on the total amount of damages recoverable after a nuclear incident,
particularly from private sources, it also contains an express provision that Congress
would revisit the extent of private liability and public contribution in the event of an
actual nuclear incident. 233 Finally, the Act was the context in which the Supreme Court
had the opportunity expressly to confirm Congress’s power to legislate a liability cap for
damages arising out of a nuclear disaster because it “provide[s] a reasonably just
substitute for the common-law state tort law remedies it replaces.” 234

232

42 U.S.C. § 2210. This includes a scheme for retroactive or “deferred” premiums for secondary
private insurance that is purchased if the primary insurance is exhausted after a nuclear event. See 42
U.S.C. § 2210(b)(1).
233
42 U.S.C. § 2210(e)(2) (“the Congress will thoroughly review the particular incident in accordance
with the procedures set forth in subsection (i) of this section and will in accordance with such procedures,
take whatever action is determined to be necessary (including approval of appropriate compensation plans
and appropriation of funds) to provide full and prompt compensation to the public for all public liability
claims resulting from a disaster of such magnitude.”)
234
Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 2620, 2638 (1978). This ruling
is generally thought to affirm Congress’s power to use liability caps to regulate tort claims and has be cited
as the authority for Congress to do so in the ATSSSA context.
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Although the Price-Anderson Act has grounded lawsuits arising out of small-scale
accidents at nuclear facilities, the statute remains untested as a method of managing the
administrative complexities of mass tort litigation, or whether various classes of litigants
under the Price-Anderson Act would encounter difficulties similar to what the ATSSSA
plaintiffs now face. The Supreme Court recognized the problem of accommodating a
large number of claimants in a post-disaster litigation scenario in Duke Power.
Congress’s consideration of this problem, in fact, was one factor motivating the Court to
approve the legislated liability cap. The Court quoted the legislative history extensively:
“‘[A] defendant with theoretically ‘unlimited’ liability may be unable to pay a judgment
once obtained. When the defendant’s assets are exhausted by earlier judgments,
subsequent claimants would be left with uncollectible awards. The prospect of
inequitable distribution would produce a race to the courthouse door in contrast to the
present system of assured orderly and equitable compensation.’” 235
The September 11th litigation exposes the flaw in this reasoning. Although a
liability cap would serve to curtail a race to the courthouse among known victims, it does
nothing to accommodate the needs of an unknown class of future claimants. Moreover,
the specter of future claimants produces the gridlock in settlement seen in amongst the
September 11th claimants. The Price-Anderson answer to the problem of future
claimants is a statutory provision (again, noted with approval by the Supreme Court) that
“no more than 15% of the [liability] limit can be distributed pending court approval of a
plan of distribution taking into account the need to assure compensation for ‘possible
latent injury claims which may not be discovered until a later time.’” 236 Future statutes
with a liability cap like the ATSSSA would do well if, at a minimum, they contained the
15% rule found in the Price-Anderson Act.
It also might be worth reconsidering some of the proposals for managing liability
caps that have arisen in the context of Price-Anderson, but that were never adopted. For
example, in 1983 the Nuclear Regulatory Commission proposed eliminating the
aggregate liability cap with an annual limit on liability. “Under this approach, each large
reactor licensee would be subject to annual assessments, to be paid until all public
liability had been satisfied.” 237 Another proposal was to eliminate the liability cap
altogether, and replace it with an obligation of the federal government to indemnify all
liability above the levels that had previously been part of the liability cap. The proposal
would have stipulated a post-accident procedure whereby Congress could draw on a
variety of sources besides federal funds to fulfill this obligation. 238
In addition to the strengths and weaknesses seen in the liability cap model from
the Price-Anderson Act, a few other statutory models exist. The Public Readiness and

235

Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 2639 (quoting Hearings on H.R. 8631 before Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 69 (1975).
236
Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 2640 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2210(o)(3)).
237
Dan M. Berkowitz, Price-Anderson Act: Model Compensation Legislation? – The Sixt-Three
Million Dollar Question, 13 HARV. ENVT’L L. REV. 1,19 (1989).
238
Id. at 33.
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Emergency Preparedness Act (PREPA) 239 immunizes designers and manufacturers of
countermeasures that are used during a period designated by the Secretary of Health as a
“public health emergency” or “threat” of a future emergency. This statute is addressed
to “all claims for loss caused by, arising out of, relating to, or resulting from the
administration to or the use by an individual of a covered countermeasure.” 240 PREPA is
primarily an administrative remedy scheme; litigation is available only in narrow
situations in which plaintiffs allege “willful misconduct,” and the statute grants the
District Court for D.C. exclusive jurisdiction over such claims.241 PREPA is an example
of how Congress can respond to certain disasters without the full use of protective
coordination or event jurisdiction concepts that shaped the ATSSSA. Although PREPA
is tied to a certain event, a national health emergency, jurisdiction is based a type of claim
as well—the covered countermeasures. 242 Moreover, Congress has decided to protect the
industry in question with immunity and an administrative remedy for victims. Although
this method may be subject to other sorts of criticisms in the realm of tort reform, 243 it
avoids the litigation and jurisdictional difficulties that a liability cap would produce.
A second example is the Y2K Act. 244 Congress passed this statute in anticipation
of widespread problems relating to computer compliance and readiness at the
millennium. Legislators were persuaded that major upsets in computer functioning could
lead to unchecked litigation and enormous liabilities in certain industries. 245 The statute
is replete with liability limitation measures such as limitations on punitive damages, 246
economic loss, 247 and special pleading and notice requirements. 248
What distinguishes PREPA and the Y2K Act from Price-Anderson is that the
liability cap measures are aimed at individual cases and claims, not at the group of cases
as a whole. Therefore, at least from a litigation efficiency perspective, these methods of
liability limitation are preferable to the general liability cap employed by the ATSSSA.
Another potential problem with an ATSSSA-style liability cap is the relationship
between establishing the cap and the availability of liability insurance. The ATSSSA, a
statute completely retrospective in scope, does nothing to address the availability of
liability insurance, because all parties facing liabilities had procured liability insurance
prior to the event in question and the subsequent congressional directive tying the
239

PREPA, 42 U.S.C. § 247.
PREPA, 42 U.S.C. § 247(a).
241
PREPA, 42 U.S.C. § 247.
242
PREPA, 42, U.S.C. § 247. The statute still has serious boundary issues. The definitions of both
the national emergency or threat thereof as well as “countermeasure” seem to invite extensive litigation
over their limits.
243
See Conk, supra note 31 at 42-45.
244
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limitation of liability to the amount of available liability insurance. Any liability caps
that are either prospective, or somehow bridge the prospective/retrospective gap must be
account for how such a liability cap will affect the pricing and availability of liability
insurance. Congress has already shown sensitivity to this problem. The Price-Anderson
Act requires nuclear contractors to purchase the maximum amount of available privately
underwritten liability insurance. 249 The Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, which constructs
a similar program of public and private insurance for losses caused by cases of foreign
terrorism, also requires the purchase of privately underwritten insurance. 250 Continued
attention to the requirement for purchase of private insurance is essential, for a
prospective liability scheme that mirrors the ATSSSA would create an incentive for the
amounts of liability insurance coverage to drop dramatically.
CONCLUSION
In an age of instant and pervasive mass media coverage, events of great
dimensions can take on instant national significance. The pressure for a federal response
is high and the action taken often hasty. The story of the ATSSSA shows how Congress,
eager to fashion a national response to a catastrophic event, created a remedy that raised
serious jurisdictional concerns from the standpoint of federalism and for coordination of
complex litigation. To assert federal judicial supremacy over resolution of disputes
Congress simply asserted jurisdiction over the entire event. To show that the federal
control would provide a sleek and efficient response Congress tied the cases together for
litigation in a single judicial district. In the short time since the September 11th attacks,
Congress has shown a willingness to use the ideas of event jurisdiction and protective
coordination as organizing concepts for a new statutory regime. The response to
Hurricane Katrina demonstrates that it is not a forgone conclusion that Congress will rush
to write statutes designing remedies that bundle together claims and place them under
exclusively federal jurisdiction.
PREPA, however, shows Congress’s favorable
disposition towards using events as an organizing concept of jurisdiction, although no
statute precisely like the ATSSSA has been passed.
This Article has shown the problems that occur when Congress addresses issues
of potential industry collapse and efficient recovery to victims by altering the
jurisdictional boundaries that normally apply to litigation. Moreover, experience in other
situations shows the possibilities for dealing with these problems by other means.
Government can protect a vulnerable industry by a number of means including direct
subsidies and tax breaks. 251 Another such approach would be for the government to
immunize an industry from certain claims and them assume all liability claims itself
under the Federal Tort Claims Act 252 as it did in the National Swine Flu Immunization
249
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251
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Program of 1976. 253 Statutes such as the Price-Anderson Act that involve both a
compensation fund and a litigation option organized around event jurisdiction and
protective coordination, and involving a liability cap require serious rethinking. The
Hurricane Katrina experience shows how coordination of post-disaster litigation can
proceed when judges and litigants make a more functional analysis of which cases to
coordinate and where they should be litigated. It also demonstrates that interjurisdictional cooperation between state and federal courts may allow parties to achieve
the efficiencies of pre-trial procedure that Congress believed it could achieve by simply
federalizing all claims arising out of a certain event.
It may be that the events of September 11th were so unique that they created a
“perfect storm” of potential litigation and hasty congressional response that is unlikely to
occur again. Even so, it is important to understand the difficulties that have ensued as a
result of the ATSSSA. If event jurisdiction and protective coordination never fully
emerge as organizing concepts of jurisdiction, then it might be that legislators have
understood the problematic nature of these ideas.
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